May 1965

NAMRATĀ

Metta-Bhavana

The Need of the Hour and of All Times

BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO

The Three Refuges of Buddhadharma

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Plotinus

His Life and Teachings

R. L. MÉGROZ

Cities and Civilization

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

The Poverty of Modern Art

A Catalogue of Aesthetic Prejudices: I

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Unto Tahtinen's *The Theories of Punishment & Non-Violence As an Ethical Principle*; Johnston's trs. of *The Crest Jewel of Wisdom*; Sartre's *The Problem of Method*; *Norwegian Folk Tales*; *The Science of Science*; *A World Elsewhere*; *Beyond Empire.*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXVI - NO. 5

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does the Evening Star
those who tread their path in darkness.

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SOPHIA WADIA

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H.P.B.—The Person

The Theosophical Idea of God

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The Fight is in the Mind

Reflections on "The Secret Doctrine"—VII

Among the Articles in the April 1965 Issue of

THE THEOSOPHICAL MOVEMENT

Subscription Rs. 4.00; 8s.; $2.00 per annum (Post Free)

THEOSOPHY COMPANY (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.

40 NEW MARINE LINES, BOMBAY 1, INDIA

THE ARYAN PATH

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Assistant Editor: Rameshchandra Sirkar

CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published monthly. Subscriptions are annual, but may begin with any desired month. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

RATES

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.25	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	1*s.* 9*d.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	50 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 1
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London W. 2

Available in the U.S.A. from	Eastern News Distributors 255 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N.Y.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXVI MAY 1965 No. 5

METTA-BHAVANA

THE NEED OF THE HOUR AND OF ALL TIMES

As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son, so let there be goodwill without measure among all beings. Let goodwill without measure prevail in the whole world, above, below, around, unstinted, unmixed with any feeling or differing or opposing interests. If a man remain steadfastly in this state of mind all the while he is awake, whether he be standing, walking, sitting, or lying down, then is come to pass the saying, "Even in this world holiness has been found!"

—*Mettā Sutta*

With right knowledge, or at any rate with a confident conviction that our neighbours will no more work to hurt us than we would think of harming them, the two-thirds of the World's evil would vanish into thin air. Were no man to hurt his brother, Karma-Nemesis would have neither cause to work for, nor weapons to act through. It is the constant presence in our midst of every element of strife and opposition, and the division of races, nations, tribes, societies and individuals into Cains and Abels, wolves and lambs, that is the chief cause of the "ways of Providence."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine*

As gold purified in the furnace rids itself of dross and reaches the quality of its own self, so the mind ridding itself of the dross of substance, force, and darkness, through meditation, enters into reality....

Outward attachment arises through sensual objects; inward attachment, through personality. Only he who, resting in the Eternal, is free from passion, is able to give them up. Freedom from passion and awakening are the wings of the spirit. O wise man, understand these two wings! For without them you cannot rise to the crown of the tree of life.

—SHANKARACHARYA: *The Crest Jewel of Wisdom*

THERE is grave concern everywhere at the growing world tension. In all countries, however, the large majority looks to its government, its legis-

lative assemblies, and its security councils to find ways and means of reducing the tension of the world and thereby avoiding a global conflict. Within each country too there are conflicting currents and mounting tensions and the prevailing mood is one of fear and of distrust.

Men and women everywhere are anxious and they seek reassurance in varied ways, while blaming their leaders and the houses of parliament. They overlook that political parties and governments are after all only machineries run and directed by men and that the gift of safety, the greatest gift there is, must come from man himself.

But we too, each one of us, are Man. Is there not something we can do to reduce tension? Thoughts like radio waves reach out in all directions. Can we not as individuals bring peace to our own minds and thereby contribute to the peace of our divided and tormented world? Modern psychology is rediscovering the fact that thought is a power and exerts its influence, directly and primarily upon the thinker himself and indirectly upon all who are touched by the thoughts the mind sends out into space. Thoughts of animosity and cruelty injure grievously those who harbour them. Acting like poison they pervert the mind and blind it.

The Full Moon of the month of Vaiśākha is sacred to the memory of Lord Buddha and marks the thrice glorious anniversary of His Birth, His Enlightenment, and His Parinirvāṇa. It is known as Buddha Pūrṇimā and this year it falls on the 15th of May. A week earlier, on the 8th, is White Lotus Day, the anniversary of the passing away of H. P. Blavatsky, the chief Founder of the present Theosophical Movement. And just before White Lotus Day, on the 5th, is Śaṅkarāchārya's *Jayanti* (Birth Anniversary). Sacred anniversary days are occasions for deep reflection and they afford golden opportunities to recall the words of the Great Spiritual Teachers whose memories are honoured.

Their wisdom has a message relevant to the present state of the world. They all affirm that hatred is our greatest enemy, that there is no ill like malice, and that we should give up all hostile feelings and cultivate loving-kindness. They tell us further that love — pure love, love untainted by lust, love untarnished by selfishness — is the greatest power on earth. Such love has its roots in eternity and is divine in essence; it can act as a strong protective shield, not limited by space or time.

The question then is — Can such love be cultivated? And the answer is in the affirmative. The divine potency of true love is enshrined in the human heart, and through meditation and self-discipline it can be unfolded. Lord Buddha, in the *Mahā Rāhulavāda Sutta* advises Rāhula thus: "Cultivate, Rāhula, the meditation on loving-kindness, for by cultivating loving-kindness ill-will is banished."

What is this meditation on loving-kindness? "As we think so we

become." The virtues can be cultivated through ideation and imagination. Meditation, as a spiritual exercise, is a most effective means of cleansing and stilling the mind, leading to direct perception, which flowers in deeds of generosity, benevolence, and wisdom. Lord Buddha enjoins certain forms of meditation for the cultivation of right attitudes and moods. They are part of a severe system of training based on a profound understanding of man. One such meditation is *Mettā-Bhāvana.*

The *Mettā-Bhāvana* is the first of the four *Brahma Viharas,* the four Illimitable Sublime Moods, which are ethical in character and have for their object the cultivation of the heart qualities, namely, friendliness or loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equal-mindedness.

How is *Mettā-Bhāvana* to be practised? After the usual necessary preparations which precede actual meditation, this *Bhāvana* begins with oneself. For it is a principle of true psychology that one's attitude to oneself must be a wholesome one, blending harmoniously humility and self-confidence. The meditation on *Mettā* starts therefore with oneself, thus: "May I be free from enmity; may I be free from ill-will; may I be rid of suffering; may I be at peace."

The next stage is to direct the same thought and feeling towards a friend, but the latter must be a living person and should not be of the opposite sex. When the thought of *Mettā* has thus been directed to a friend, one is ready to apply it towards someone to whom one is indifferent, whom one neither likes nor dislikes, and finally towards someone who is hostile — a more difficult injunction, for the carrying out of which the Buddhist scriptures give detailed instructions.

Thus there are four stages: oneself, one's friend, a person towards whom one is neutral, an enemy. When this has been successfully achieved, the feeling of loving-kindness can be widened and extended. This is done in three stages, without limitation, with limitation, in all ten directions. In the *Patisaṃbhidhā* these three methods are outlined as: (1) limitless, to all beings and all creatures without distinctions, "May all be free from enmity and at peace"; (2) with limitation, specifically directed to all women, all men, all holy ones, all ordinary people, all the *devas* or Gods, all human beings, all those in states of woe; (3) in all ten directions: East, West, North, South, North-East, North-West, South-West, South-East, above, and below.

There are variations given in different texts, but, according to all, the force of *Mettā* is to be radiated deliberately and made to pervade one's whole sphere of influence.

The above is only a rough outline of this most potent Meditation. For a more detailed description we refer our readers to any authentic books on Buddhism and to the original texts of the Buddhist Canon,

notably the *Suttas* dealing with *Mettā,* such as the *Karaniya Metta Sutta,* which is usually read at the beginning and at the close of the *Mettā-Bhāvana.*

True peace can only come to the world through minds purged of ill-will and radiating the beneficent energy of *Mettā.* No greater homage can be paid to the Blessed One than to practise *Mettā-Bhāvana.* In the words of H. P. Blavatsky:

> ... if the simple, humane and philosophical code of daily life left to us by the greatest Man-Reformer [the Buddha] ever known, should ever come to be adopted by mankind at large, then indeed an era of bliss and peace would dawn on Humanity.

May we contribute to hastening that Dawn!

NAMRATĀ

LET me say one thing I KNOW: only the feeling of true brotherhood, of true love towards humanity aroused in the soul of someone strong enough to stem this tide, can carry us through. For LOVE and TRUST are the only weapons that can overcome the REAL enemies against which the true theosophist must fight. If I, or you, go into this battle from pride, from self-will, from desire to hold our position in the face of the world, from anything but the purest motives, we shall fail. Let us search ourselves well and look at it as we never looked before: see if there is in us the reality of the brotherhood which we preach and which we are supposed to represent.

—W. Q. JUDGE

THE THREE REFUGES OF BUDDHADHARMA

[**Bhikkhu Khantipalo** is the author of *Tolerance: A Study from Buddhist Sources* (reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH of April 1964). He writes in this article as a devout and well-studied practitioner of the *Dharma,* the Law taught by the Buddha. It is appropriate that in this month of the Buddha Purnima he should expound the deeper aspects of the first step in Buddhism: the taking of the Triple Refuge, in the Buddha, the *Dharma,* and the *Sangha.* The Triple Refuge is not simply a Buddhist ritual; it expresses psychological and spiritual truths that concern any human soul, striving to direct its evolution by the light of the eternal *Dharma,* which is taught by the Enlightened Ones, and is to be practised in spiritual brotherhood with all beings.—ED.]

ONE who wishes to go for Refuge (*Śaraṇagamana*) to the *Buddha,* the Dharma, and the Saṅgha usually prefaces his declaration by praising the *Samyak Saṃbuddhas* (perfectly Enlightened Ones), as they represent the highest goal in Buddhist spiritual training. He does this by thrice repeating: *"Namo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammāsambuddhassa."*

We shall later discuss the significance of the *Triśaraṇa,* but meanwhile a definition of one who goes to them for his Refuge (a "Buddhist") would be useful. He might be described thus:

A Buddhist is a man or woman who has gone for Refuge to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, holding that this *Triratna* (Trinity of Jewels) constitutes the noblest, most secure, and practical ideals to which he or she devotes his or her life for their inward realization. A true Buddhist sees no reason to go to any other Refuges apart from these three. Moreover, he governs his life by trying to apply at least the principles of the *Pañca Śīla* (the Five Ethical Rules) to all circumstances that arise.

Generally speaking, in India, when people say that they are Buddhists (while really still attached to rituals and *deva*-worship), they mean that they have a sort of vague *bhakti* for the historical person of Gautama the Buddha without knowing what He taught (the Dharma), or even pausing to consider the Saṅgha. Thus they divorce the Buddha from His Dharma and those devoted to that Dharma — the Saṅgha. It is only by this treatment, which is considered very strange by real Buddhists, that the story of the Buddha being the ninth *Avatāra* of *Viṣṇu* (as contained in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*) can possibly be supported. It is noteworthy that no Buddhists have ever supported any such theory, which degrades the Buddha-attainment possible for every person into a god's descent from heaven.

From what has been said, we should understand that Buddhists regard

the *Triratna* as inseparable and that one cannot truly count oneself a Buddhist if one ignores either one or two of these Jewels.



Above are two diagrams showing all possible relations between the *Triratna*. Relations 1 and 6 show how from the Dharma come the Buddha and the Saṅgha. The highest expression of the Dharma is called *Prajñāpāramitā*, and this Perfection of Wisdom is sometimes known as the *Buddhamāta* (Mother of the Buddhas), since without *Prajñāpāramitā* there can be no Enlightenment (*saṃbodhi*) and hence no Buddhas. The Enlightened Ones are in fact "born" from *Prajñāpāramitā*. The Dharma is here thought of as the true cosmic order, knowledge of which is periodically discovered when a Bodhisattva attains *Samyak Saṃbodhi*. It is the knowledge of this great Law in the cosmos that makes a man pursuing the Bodhisattva Path into a Buddha. The Buddhas are called "Path-finders," those who have discovered the Ancient Way of Dharma traversed by many previous Buddhas and their followers but later forgotten. The Dharma is also the origin of the Sangha (6); for unless Shakyamuni had preached the *Dharmacakrapravartana Sutra* at Sarnath-Isipattana, the first five members of the Saṅgha could never have attained the *Dharmacakṣu* (Dharma-eye) and never have become the first disciples to enter the Ārya Saṅgha (Noble Order).

Unless there is at first the discovery of the Way by the Buddha, obviously there cannot exist any Saṅgha — neither the *bhikṣusaṅgha* nor the community of Noble Ones, the Ārya Saṅgha. This accounts for relation number 2. Besides establishing the Saṅgha, both by laying down the rules of conduct (the *Vinaya* for *bhikṣus*) and by making possible the Dharma-realization (of the Āryas), the Buddha also establishes the Dharma by preaching what are collected as the *Sūtras* (the *pariyatti-dhamma*), instructing followers how to practise (*patipatti-dhamma*), and guiding them towards Dharma-realization (*pativedha-dhamma*). All this is covered by relation number 4.

The members of the Saṅgha (at relation number 3), teach, practise, and realize the Dharma, while it is the members of the Ārya Saṅgha (who may be either religious or lay people) who have known *Bodhi* (the Quality of Buddhahood) as at number 5. Or one might explain this relation by saying that a Bodhisattva is one who has dedicated his life to the attainment of *Samyak Saṃbodhi* whether in this life or in some future existence.

We shall further explain below the interrelatedness of the *Triratna* when considered as the *Triśaraṇa* to which Buddhists go for Refuge.

Notice that a Buddhist *goes* for Refuge (*gacchāmi* — I go). The verb "to go" is active, indicating that a Buddhist has to make effort to obtain, and maintain himself in, these Refuges. One is *not* a Buddhist if one merely recites the *Triśaraṇa* once a week or so, without accompanying this recitation with Buddhist practice in one's everyday life.

Nor does one "take" Refuge. Nothing is taken, since taking and getting are the ways of worldliness. "Going for Refuge," on the contrary, implies renunciation, since there is no true *Triśaraṇagamana* where this quality is absent. Giving up one's likes and dislikes and trying to break the grip of delusion (*moha*), with humility one replaces these by the shining lights of the *Triśaraṇa,* which are excellent ideals for practice in one's life.

Since Buddhists are, by definition, those who go for Refuge to the *Triratna,* naturally they must comprehend the meaning of those Refuges. Without understanding what is meant by the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, it would be impossible to go to them for Refuge. Without such knowledge it would be like a Poona man who wished to go to Bombay — but actually set out in the direction of Bangalore.

The *Anussati*(s) (Skt., *Anusmṛti*) are an important group of Buddhist meditations, numbering among them the Recollections of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha. It is therefore of great importance for a Buddhist to understand the ancient texts on which these Recollections are based, since the Qualities (*guṇas*) described in these texts are the basis for one method of *Śaraṇagamana.*

The *Buddhaśaraṇa* is described in the passage listing the nine famous titles or attributes of the Enlightened One:

> Thus indeed is the Exalted One — Worthy One, Perfectly Enlightened One, Endowed with Knowledge and Conduct, the Well-born, Knower of the Worlds, the Unexcelled Trainer of Men to be Tamed, Teacher of Gods and Men, the Awake, and One Blessed with All Virtues.

The *Dhammaśaraṇa* is likewise described in a Pali passage usually found in association with the above. *"Dhammam saraṇam gacchāmi"* means that one takes Refuge in these six Qualities (*guṇas*) of the Dhamma:

> Well-expounded is the Exalted One's Dhamma, of Immediate Fruit, Timeless(-ly true), Inviting One to Come-and-See, Leading On from Step to Step, To be Realized Individually by Each Wise Man.

The third passage which occurs with the other two in Pali describes the *Saṅghaguṇas* or the Qualities of the *Ārya* (noble or consummate)

Saṅgha. It is to these Qualities that one goes when repeating *"Sangham saraṇam gacchāmi"*:

> Well Practising (their Way) are the disciples of the Exalted One; Uprightly Practising (their Way) are the disciples of the Exalted One; Wisely Practising (their Way) are the disciples of the Exalted One; Conducting Themselves Well are the disciples of the Exalted One. They are the four pairs of (holy) men, the eight (holy) persons. These are the disciples of the Exalted One, Worthy of Reverence, Worthy of Salutation, Worthy of Gifts, Those for whom the Palms Should Be Placed Together (in worship), the Unexcelled Field for (the sowing of) Merit in the world.

As it must be admitted that it will be difficult at first for many people to bear in mind the whole of these Recollections while reciting the *Śaraṇa,* it may be better to select some particular aspect of each and concentrate upon that. Any one of the *Buddhaguṇas* which particularly attracts one may be used. Similarly, one of the *Dhammaguṇas* may be chosen, such as *"Ehipassiko"* (the Dhamma invites one to come-and-see), since this is a unique and marvellous part of Buddhist teaching. One Quality from amongst the *Saṅghaguṇas* may also be taken for Recollection, such as the Noble Ones' Quality of *"Ūjū,"* whereby, for instance, they could not do in private anything which they would hesitate to do in public.

This way of *Śaraṇagamana* will be useful to many people and leads them to a deeper understanding of what is meant by the *Śaraṇa* in *Buddhadhamma.*

However, some further interpretations of the *Triśaraṇa* may be included in our brief review. Ancient carvings and modern Tibetan paintings sometimes depict a set of three figures consisting of a golden-yellow Shakyamuni in the centre, with the red-coloured Prajñāpāramitā on His right and the white form of Avalokiteśvara on His left. This trio does in fact represent visually the *Triśaraṇa* in the following way. The *Buddha-śaraṇa* is depicted as Shakyamuni, whom we revere as the last *Samyak Saṃbuddha* to have appeared on this earth. The *Dhamma* and the *Saṅgha Śaraṇas* are then shown as aspects of *Samyak Saṃbodhi*: *Prajñāpāramitā* being the essence of Dharma-realization, while Avalokiteśvara is the Bodhisattva of Compassion representing the merciful activity of the Saṅgha in propagating the Buddha's *Kalyāṇadharma* (Beneficent Dharma) out of compassion. Shakyamuni's golden-yellow is the shining forth of the most precious *Saṃbodhi.* The fiery red of Prajñāpāramitā indicates that she has the Quality of burning up all defilements of the mind. Avalokiteśvara bears in his hands a flask of nectar for the relief of the world's sorrows (the nectar is of course the Teachings of the Buddha), while his white colour emphasizes that compassion (*Karuṇā*), as taught by the Buddha, is always grounded in and accompanied by purity of conduct in

mind, speech, and action.

It will be apparent that in this method of representation, although the symbols used for the *Śaraṇa* are exterior forms, nevertheless they all refer to facets of interior experience. Another way of understanding the *Śaraṇa* emphasizes this even more. The *Buddhaśaraṇa* is then the possibility which exists for all beings of attaining *Saṃbodhi* (although they are more or less impeded in doing so by the *kleśa*-coverings existing in their own minds). This possibility, which lies hidden as a jewel beneath a heap of refuse, is called the *Bodhicitta.* Thus the *Buddhaśaraṇa* lies within. The *Dharmaśaraṇa* is then nothing less than the Dharma, or knowledge arising from the experience of *Bodhi.* The *Dhammaśaraṇa* thus also lies within. The *Śaraṇa* in the Saṅgha can no longer be regarded as anything exterior to oneself and is in fact the constellation of all the noble factors of mind (*cetasikā, caitta-dharmāḥ*) which when combined make for the experience of *Bodhi* and make the person experiencing it a member of the *Ārya-saṅgha.* The *Saṅghaśaraṇa* is thus also to be sought within.

A last look at the *Triśaraṇa* will prove to be a link with what is really the heart of these *Śaraṇas.* Before we touch upon that, it is useful to remember a meditation-category found in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras,* where it is said that the subject, the object, and the action are, in any situation, all empty (*śunya*) of any abiding entity (*ātman*), being apparent detached moments isolated out of complex existence-patterns which are ever-changing (*anitya*); in one word, subject, object, and action are all: *Śunyatā.* Applying this knowledge to the *Triśaraṇa*: The Buddha is the Knower (subject), the Dharma is the Knowledge (object), and the Saṇgha — of mental factors (*cetasika*) and processes (*citta*) — constitutes the Knowing. The Buddha (one who has discovered the Truth of *Sabbe dhammā anatta'ti* — All events are essenceless or without atman) is thus considered an aspect of *Śunyatā*; the Dharma is likewise, in its deepest aspect, the realization of *Śunyatā*; and the Saṇgha, given an interior interpretation, must also be an aspect of *Śunyatā* since all factors (*cetasikā*) and functions of mind (*citta*) are always recognized to be *śunya* or *anātman.* The *Triśaraṇa* cannot be three different *śunyatās*; for there can be only one. This *Śunyatā* cannot be realized outwardly, but is the reward of those who look to find the Truth within their hearts.

Is this not the meaning of the great exhortation which the Buddha delivered to His disciples before He attained *Mahāparinirvāṇa*? He then said:

> Therefore, Ānanda, live as lamps unto yourselves (*attadīpa*), as refuges unto yourselves (*attaśaraṇa*), with no other refuges, the lamps of Dharma,

the refuges of Dharma, and no other refuges. (*Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta*, Ch. II, 26).

The Dharma which the Buddha goes on to describe as that to be used as *Dharmaśaraṇa* is *Satipaṭṭhāṇa*, the discipline in the development of *Sati* (*Smṛti* — Mindfulness), which points directly to *Śunyatā*. Penultimately, the *Śaraṇa* to which we must go is our own PRACTICE of DHARMA. Ultimately, no other Refuge is needed than for us to be our own *attadīpa* and *attaśaraṇa*; for this is the marvellous Refuge of the REALIZATION of DHARMA.

The various aspects of *Śaraṇagamana* outlined here lie along the Buddha's Way and are discovered as one progresses along that Way. As we know, this Way leads to the progressive discarding of wrong views (*mithyā dṛṣti*), accompanied by ever-deepening insight (*vipaśyanā*) into that Way. Those upon the initial stages of the Way will find it best to go for Refuge as explained by the Recollections (*Anussati*), while it is obvious that the injunction to be *attadīpa, attaśaraṇa* will only be achieved fully by those who have Dharma-realization. *Śaraṇagamana* must be made in the way that one feels to be natural, while humility, an indispensable Quality in going for Refuge, will advise one to adopt a really sincere attitude.

Among the factors necessary for true *Śaraṇagamana*, humility is very important. The Buddha is the One-who-knows while we are those who do not know. The Dharma is the perfect knowledge, while our understanding is still imperfect. The Saṅgha of realization is our goal, but we are not yet come there. Confronted by these mighty ideals, the range of which we do but imperfectly comprehend, who could be otherwise than humble?

In place of *avidyā, tṛshnā*, and *māna* (ignorance, craving, and pride), the good Buddhist places the high ideals of the *Triratna* and these become ever more excellent Refuges for him as he practises the Way which he has chosen.

However, humility by itself will not be sufficient, since in *Buddhadharma* one also has to *understand*. While humility says, "The Buddha knows and I do not know," wisdom (*prajñā*) adds to this, "but knowledge shall come (to me)." No blind, humble devotees are encouraged by the Buddha, who asks everyone to use their intelligence, to develop it systematically into wisdom, to question and probe everything that is not yet understood clearly and so come finally to that *Prajñā-pāramitā* known to all the Buddhas. Humility, which is an aspect of faith (*śraddhā*), and *Prajñā* necessarily go hand in hand in Buddhist mind-development (*bhāvana*). With them must also go energy (*vīrya*) and patience (*kṣanti*),

invaluable upon the Way of the Buddha. Endowed with such qualities as these, a Buddhist will come to understand for himself the subtler meanings of *Śaraṇagamana,* so that one day, when asked, *"Triśaraṇagamana sampūrṇam?"* ([Have you] completed the Three Refuges?), he may answer with the assurance of his own inward knowledge, *"Āma, Bhante"* (Yes, Venerable Sir).

BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO

THE BEST should be the dearest of all things to us! And in our love of it, neither advantage nor injury, gain nor loss, honour nor dishonour, praise nor blame, nor anything of the kind should be regarded; but what is in truth the Noblest and Best should be also the dearest of all things, and that for no other cause than that it is the Noblest and Best. Hereby should a man order his life, within and without! . . .

So long as a man seeks his best as *his,* and for his own sake, he will never find it. For so long as he does this, he seeks himself, and imagines that he is himself the Best; and seeing that he is not the Best, he seeks not the Best, so long as he seeks himself. But whosoever seeks, loves, and pursues the Good for the sake of the Good and for nothing but the love of the Good, he will find it, for he seeks it aright. And they who seek it otherwise, err.

—*Theologia Germanica*

PLOTINUS

HIS LIFE AND TEACHINGS

[Our old friend, **Shri B. V. Narayana Reddy**, gives an outline of the venerable life and profound teaching of Plotinus. In her *Theosophical Glossary* Madame Blavatsky wrote of him:

"The noblest, highest and grandest of all the Neo-Platonists after the founder of the school, Ammonius Saccas. He was the most enthusiastic of the *Philalethians* or 'lovers of truth,' whose aim was to found a religion on a system of intellectual abstraction, which is true Theosophy, or the whole substance of Neo-Platonism."

The striking parallels between his teaching and Vedantic philosophy are among the signs which point to the existence of a universal religion based on direct spiritual experience.—Ed.]

Plotinus was a philosopher with many facets. He was a profound thinker, who systematized the teaching of his great master Plato and brought out its mystical and religious significance. He was a man of the world to whom men submitted their differences and disputes for a just solution. He was father to the orphan and the widow, whose worldly possessions he safeguarded by his prudence and care. He was a mystic who sought inspiration by daily communion with the Eternal. He lived a life of such purity that men who came in contact with him reverenced him like a god. It was not without justification that the oracle of Apollo raised this undying song to his memory:

> I raise an undying song, to the memory of a gentle friend, a hymn of praise woven to the honey-sweet tones of my lyre under the touch of the golden plectrum. Celestial! Man at first, but now nearing the diviner ranks! the bonds of human necessity are loosened for you and, strong of heart, you beat your eager way from out the roaring tumult of the fleshly life to the shores of that wave-washed coast free from the thronging of the guilty, thence to take the grateful path of the sinless soul: Oft-times, when your mind thrust out awry and was like to be rapt down in unsanctioned paths, the Immortals themselves prevented, guiding you on the straight going-way to the celestial spheres, pouring down before you a dense shaft of light that your eyes might see from amid the mournful gloom. Sleep never closed those eyes: high above the heavy murk of the mist you held them; tossed in the welter, you still had vision; still you saw sights many and fair not granted to all that labour in wisdom's quest.

Plotinus himself tells us nothing about his life in his own writings. He would never say anything about his parents or birthplace; and he often said that he was ashamed of being in the body. He showed, too, an unconquerable reluctance to sit to a painter or sculptor, and when Amelius

persisted in urging him to allow a portrait to be made he asked him, "Is it not enough to carry about this image in which nature has enclosed us? Do you really think I must also consent to leave, as a desirable spectacle to posterity, an image of the image?" Porphyry, his friend and biographer, however, tells us that a good portrait of his was painted in his lifetime without his knowledge; but there is no evidence that a copy of it exists. Nothing definite is known of his place of birth; but it has been generally assumed that he came from Egypt. According to the best available evidence, his date of birth seems to have been A.D. 205. He began the study of philosophy rather late in life; and the teacher who influenced him most was Ammonius Saccas. He spent over a decade with this teacher and, at the age of thirty-nine, he developed a desire to study Persian and Indian philosophy and joined the Emperor Gordian's expedition to the East in the hope that he might meet competent teachers during the course of his stay in Persia and India. There is, however, no evidence that he was able to visit these countries, as the expedition was a failure and the Emperor himself was murdered in Mesopotamia early in A.D. 244.

About the age of forty Plotinus settled in Rome and began to teach philosophy. During the next decade or so his fame as a great thinker was firmly established, and he was honoured by the friendship of the Emperor Gallienus and his wife and of many other famous men and scholars from all over the Roman empire. He did not, however, take any active part in public life; though men and women of the highest rank sought his advice in their personal problems and found in him a sagacious friend and guide. He was easily accessible to rich and poor alike, and his house was full of young people of whose education and properties he was in charge. He was meticulous in his care of their property and spent long hours in scrutinizing the accounts that were submitted to him on behalf of his wards. During his long stay of over a quarter of a century in Rome, he acted as arbitrator in various disputes between private and official parties; but never once was his judgement or fairness impugned by anybody.

Plotinus never enjoyed robust health. His eyesight was bad and his austere habits and long sleepless hours spent in contemplation were a terrible strain on his physical resources. In A.D. 269 the illness from which he suffered became so much worse that he left Rome for the country estate of his friend Zethus in Campania, and he died there in A.D. 270. The illness of which he died has been identified as a form of leprosy. He bore his sufferings with great equanimity, and, when death came, he faced it like the wise, great man he was. Of these last moments, his friend Eustochius has given a touching account. He was staying at Puteoli and was late in arriving. When, at last, he came, Plotinus said, "I have been

a long time waiting for you; I am striving to give back the Divine in me, to the Divine in the All." As he spoke a snake crept under the bed on which he lay and slipped away into a hole in the wall: at the same moment Plotinus died. It was the wise Socrates who told his mourning friends that the true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die and that the votary of philosophy is always pursuing death and dying. The truth of this statement is exemplified in the manner of Plotinus' death. Great men, who have lived nobly, develop a profound insight into the truth of things as they reach the end of their earthly pilgrimage; and of the pregnant sayings attributed to them during their last moments, the words of the dying Plotinus to his friend are among the most profound — "I am striving to give back the Divine in me, to the Divine in the All." These words epitomize in a small compass the fundamental teaching of Plotinus.

His basic position is that reality is fundamentally One, not in the arithmetical sense, which is the opposite of "many," but as the transcendent and immanent reality from which all things emanate and into which all things merge. It is the matrix of all things, spiritual, mental, and material, and all other conceivable and inconceivable states of being. The One has no parts and cannot be taken apart or destroyed. It is beyond time and space: it involves no conflicts because it is beyond all opposites. It is nameless because to name it implies finitude and limitation. It cannot be the object of thought, because thought involves the duality of subject and object. It would be inaccurate even to say that the One exists; because existence implies limitation. Nevertheless language has to be used to express the inexpressible; and when we speak and write of the One we must always bear in mind the limitations of language and its inadequacy to convey ultimate truths.

The close resemblance of the thought of Plotinus to the Vedantic conception of Brahman or the Buddhist idea of *Tathatā* (sometimes translated "Suchness") should be obvious. The Buddha referred to this reality in these solemn words:

> There is a not-born, a not-become, a not-created, a not-formed. If there is not this not-born, this not-become, this not-created, this not-formed, then here an escape from the born, the become, the created, the formed, could not be known.

The One is the primal reality in which there is no imperfection, no duality, and no limitation; and yet there is imperfection in the world in which we live. How is this explained? According to Plotinus all things must exist for ever in ordered dependence upon one another. Those other than the One have come into being because it is a law of necessary production that each principle must produce the level of being immediately

below it as a necessary consequence of its own existence. Perfection would cease to have any meaning unless there were imperfect things in the world. Imperfection is thus created by a process of emanation, and is derived from the One by a process of logical necessity. Finite existence is therefore a progressive falling away from the original perfection. The process may be compared to the shining of a bright light which illumines the darkness without itself losing any of its brightness or to a cup overflowing because its contents are infinite and cannot be confined within it. The brightness of the light decreases in intensity until it loses itself in the surrounding darkness, and the overflow from the perennial spring becomes a mere trickle the further it travels from the central source.

Accordingly the primeval One manifests itself as the *Nous* in its first stage of descent from the original state of perfection. The word *Nous* has been variously translated: as the Intellectual Principle by Stephen MacKenna; as Spirit by Dean Inge; as the Rational Mind by others. Perhaps the best equivalent is the word "Spirit" used by Dean Inge. *Nous* or the *Logos* is the first image of the One; it is His image as the First Thinker, and inseparable from the Thinker are his first thoughts, which subsist in the spiritual world. The thoughts of God, which Plato called "Ideas," are the eternal realities of all that is manifested or manifestable. For example, the "Idea" of treeness is the producing cause of an infinite number of trees. And thus too with all other things. "Here" they are in part, particularized, and separated, but "there" they are perfect, universal, and united. *Nous* is, accordingly, the kingdom of all absolute verities, permanent values, and ultimate attributes. It is the realm of ideas, ideals, and archetypes. It is both essence and existence.

The next stage in the manifestation of the One is the Soul, the Oversoul or World Soul. The Soul is essentially a unity, unlike Matter, which is essentially a Plurality. The unity of the Universal Soul does not, however, exclude the plurality of souls. Individual souls are comprehended in the Universal Soul. The entire Universe, including the stars and galaxies, is held in place by the unifying nature of the Universal Soul, in the same manner as the activities of the human body are held in harmony by the individual soul. In other words the Soul is a Plural-Unity which enters into relation with all beings and things. The Soul pervades the universe as it also pervades the human body; but it is difficult to explain the precise character of the Soul's relations with its vehicles. When the soul enters into relations with the body, it becomes individual though universal. It is as if someone who was expert in a whole science confined himself to a single proposition. It is as if the fire which is endowed with the power of burning everything touched some small object and burnt it up.

The last and final stage in the descent of the One is the material world. The world of matter is a relative, conditioned, and limited reflex of the spiritual world. It is subject to change, growth, decay, and death. Therefore it is spatial and temporal. Matter, as such, never is. It is always becoming, without ever persisting in its condition or being able to come out of it. But it can never pass into nothingness. It is indestructible. It either reverts to its primal condition or it fulfils its true purpose as the recipient of order by being gradually redeemed in the regenerating process set up by the Soul when consciously converted into Spirit.

How does this process of liberation or ascent from matter to Soul, from Soul to *Nous* and from *Nous* to the One take place? The Plotinian path to liberation is three-fold, viz., through the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. In the True the intelligible unity of all things is revealed. In the Good the harmony and order of life is manifested. But in the Beautiful is the final perfection and consummation of all. Hence the soul rejoices when it beholds the Truth and is happy when it is in harmony with the Good; but its highest experiences are those wherein it beholds the Supreme Beauty.

> How do we come to the vision of the inaccessible Beauty, dwelling as if in consecrated precincts and remote from the common ways, where all might see, even the profane? He that has strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards what they tell of.... And this inner vision, what is its operation? Newly awakened, it is all too feeble to learn the ultimate splendour. Therefore the Soul must be trained to the habit of remarking, first all noble pursuits; then the works of beauty produced not by the labour of the arts but by the virtue of men known for their goodness; lastly you must search the souls of those that have shaped these beautiful forms.
>
> But how are you to see into the virtuous soul and know its loveliness? Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the God-like splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.

B. V. Narayana Reddy

CITIES AND CIVILIZATION

[We are glad to welcome back to our pages an old and esteemed friend, **Mr. R. L. Megroz**, who is critic, biographer, poet, and dramatist. The wide range of his studies includes the psychology of dreams, popular natural history, humour in literature and art, the literary significance of various important authors, and poetry. The city, rightly regarded, is more than an economic focus of civilization: it is the image of human brotherhood. Mr. Mégroz's remarks are suggestive.—Ed.]

We live in an epoch of unparalleled "development" and owing to unprecedented facilities of transport and communication there is a turmoil of ideas in every continent. This applies in various ways to the most advanced industrial nations no less than to the host of newly constituted nations who are striving to catch up with the technical applications of scientific knowledge.

What is going on can be described as a world-wide revolution marking the arrival of a new age; but it can be realized by the majority of people only slowly, not least because the powerful or influential individuals are far from agreement upon the most desirable direction of "progress," even though the answer is germane to questions about the future of humanity.

The most urgent, and as yet not decisively answered, questions can be summed up: War or Peace? Starvation and Chaos, or World Planning by a body that deserves the title of United Nations Organization?

It may be that such vital questions will not be answered until the tasks of construction and reconstruction have been pushed forward a long way yet, and with more consistent idealism than hitherto. Needless to say, the efforts required are immense, even if only the material aspect of this world-wide problem is considered. But psychological factors have to be allowed for, and this calls for adequate creative support to sway the policy-makers into awareness of other than business methods.

It is obvious that priority must be given to world planning of social developments on a more comprehensive scale; but the international efforts since the second world war are a rebuke to despair. Among these are the application of new scientific discoveries, as in medicine and hygiene and nutrition. The saving of lives and the improvement of living conditions, though as yet small compared with needs, has in some countries led to a rise in population causing a crisis due to food shortages. Until local agriculture can be radically improved, the extra food will have to be imported. But with adequate plans and ability to apply them this situation, and many similar ones, would not have arisen.

Organization in this fragmentary fashion applies to most of the con-

structive activities, whether national or international, and is due to uncertainty of policy and lack of unity among the responsible departments. The cure is a long way ahead: it can come only after much more achievement, both physical and mental.

This brings us back to the universal dichotomy, the two halves of what should be seen as one Whole. But, for the rulers or would-be rulers, there is an observation of some pertinence, made by the philosophical Irish Bishop Berkeley:

> Whatever the world may think, he who hath not meditated much on God, the humane mind, and the *summum bonum,* may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman.

We have no need to question the Bishop's wisdom here, though today we are inclined to insist that the "humane mind" accept the importance of science, and the *summum bonum,* or chief good, as due to a combination of religion (in the broadest sense) and the cultivation of the sciences and arts. This has a special force in an epoch of rapid expansion of the whole field of education.

That influential British historian, G. M. Trevelyan, in his *English Social History* wrote: "Education has produced a vast population able to read but unable to distinguish what is worth reading," which can be taken as an example of the consequences of fragmentary planning. Fortunately the true nature and aim of education are better realized today as a key to individual and collective culture.

So any practicable approach to a Utopian ideal city or state (which implies the ideal civilization) depends upon organized and united efforts. Trevelyan's comment on elementary literacy, however, serves to remind us of the progress still to be made on the road to good citizenship. The "vast population" already taught to read is outnumbered, in the world as a whole, by the still illiterate, notwithstanding the campaign for literacy since the last world war, carried out by UNESCO and other organizations.

After such groundwork has been extended, education will need some reliable signposts to a worth-while future, just as do industrial production and trade. Here is a crucial statement relating to education in its deeper sense:

> Fundamentally, education is not a matter of the three R's; of literacy or illiteracy; of primary, secondary and university courses. These and other factors have their place and value; but the fundamental principle of education is the gaining of the power of Self-Rule by every man, woman and child.

This quotation is from the first of three Extension Lectures delivered for Mysore University by Shrimati Sophia Wadia in 1937, the theme being "Preparation for Citizenship." They were printed and published as a book after the end of the second world war, but it is interesting also that this forward-looking guide based largely on Sanskrit wisdom and a critical knowledge of the modern world was first published in THE ARYAN PATH in 1937.

Closely parallel with education, economic activity also reveals opposite aspects: one is empirical and by energetic use of technical skill can achieve civilizing wonders on the material plane; the other aspect is essential, however, to avoid the disaster of rivalries leading to war, national and international: it can be called social conscience, or, more definitely, moral and spiritual intuition. For an authoritative quotation this time I turn to an enlightened economist, R. H. Tawney. Among many telling passages, he wrote in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*:

> Economic efficiency is a necessary element in the life of any sane and vigorous society, and only the incorrigible sentimentalist will depreciate its significance. But to convert efficiency from an instrument into a primary object is to destroy efficiency itself. For the condition of effective action in a complex civilization is co-operation. And the condition of co-operation is agreement, both as to the ends to which effort should be applied, and the criteria by which its success is to be judged. Agreement as to ends implies the acceptance of a standard of values. . . . But it cannot itself be merely economic, since the comparative importance of economic and of other interests — the sacrifice, for example, of material goods worth incurring in order to extend leisure, or develop education, or humanize toil — is precisely the point on which it is needed to throw light. It must be based on some conception of the requirements of human nature as a whole. . . .

I can only hope that the groundwork of a Utopian future society is indicated in these cursory notes on practical and philosophic problems of our time. The title "Cities and Civilization" is partly a reflection of the theme. Cities have always been linked with the growth of civilization, and more often than not they belong to imaginative descriptions of an ideal state or what we call a Utopia. The most primitive communities, of the kind rapidly disappearing, are small and crude, from families to tribes. Group-hunting for food marked perhaps the first and most important form of co-operation. Then came the taming of animals and awareness of edible crops which could be cultivated. The comparative stability of the agricultural community facilitated bigger groups.

In this phase, starting long before written history, the curious two-legged mammal began making a bee-line for what was to be called civili-

zation. Practical inventions, increasing co-operation, what may be called arts and crafts, and imaginative myths embodying religious intuitions prepared the foundations of more complex societies, which were often cruel and destructive and stupid, but still holding elements of future wisdom. As civilization and population began to grow much faster, in the earliest historical times, or slightly before — say five thousand years ago — cities were being built in Babylonia, Egypt, India, and soon after in China. We need not be much surprised at this. We have much yet to discover about prehistoric communities, but we do know such indicative facts as the wonderful cave and rock-shelter paintings, drawings, and engravings belonging to what is called the Old Stone Age, and ten thousand to twenty thousand years before the earliest cities we know about.

Among a host of other thought-stimulating statements, Lewis Mumford, in *The Culture of Cities,* wrote:

> The city is a fact in nature, like a cave, a run of mackerel or an ant-heap. But it is also a conscious work of art, and it holds within its communal framework many simpler and more personal forms of art. Mind takes form in the city; and in turn, urban forms condition mind. For space, no less than time, is artfully reorganized in cities: in boundary lines and silhouettes, in the fixing of horizontal planes and vertical peaks, in utilizing or denying the natural site, the city records the attitude of a culture and an epoch to the fundamental facts of its existence. The dome and the spire, the open avenue and the closed court, tell the story, not merely of different physical accommodations, but of essentially different conceptions of man's destiny. The city is both a physical utility for collective living and a symbol of those collective purposes and unanimities that arise under such favouring circumstance. With language itself, it remains man's greatest work of art.

While being stimulated, as usual, by Mumford's torrent of ideas, one is likely to demur at some of his conclusions. No doubt the typical city — in the sense of a major centre of population and activity — represents mainly the culture it belongs to. But to say that it is "a fact in nature, like a cave, or a run of mackerel or an ant-heap" is an exaggeration, or at least misleading, as "nature" can be said to include all life. Certainly the "fact of nature" cannot be reconciled with the assumption that the city is "also a conscious work of Art." Much of a city's growth, and often its situation, reflect the minimum of intelligent planning, even though it may still vaguely reflect human intentions. (These have often been nothing more than to get the biggest possible quick profit.) Much of the average imperfect city suggests a medley of mainly subconscious motives,

and only the newest cities avoid the jumble of relics from past epochs. It is a relief to realize that the city does at least include and shelter works of art, not least particularly architecturally good buildings, and one can be glad that a fair share of the good new buildings are for new schools and colleges in many countries.

Maybe no city can ever be perfect in its physical form. For it is scarcely conceivable that a human society can achieve the perfection that would be needed to create such a city. In an apocryphal old legend of the Creation it is told how God named each creature, adding each time that it was "good," until He came to Man.

Should we conclude that any Utopian picture of an ideal community is but a dream of a non-existent reality? If so we are in agreement with more than one Utopian author, particularly with the fifteenth-sixteenth-century Sir Thomas More, who invented the title *Utopia* for the most famous of his books. The word was derived from two Greek words, meaning "not-a-place" or "nowhere." More's Utopia was supposed to be on a newly discovered island of North America (it was not long after the Columbus expedition and others that followed). A remarkable feature of More's Utopia was the account of its legal system, the laws being superior to any that had been conceived in his own country or elsewhere.

The title was used at least twice after More by two nineteenth-century fellow countrymen, but translated. There was the Victorian poet and sociologist William Morris's *News from Nowhere,* which glowed with an imaginary happiness in England after the abolition of the benighted old economic and legal systems, including money, the use of which had been forgotten. So perhaps the titles should not be taken to suggest pessimism in the authors. Morris's contemporary, however, Samuel Butler, in *Erewhon* and *Erewhon Revisited* describes an isolated society in New Zealand, and, though the community had some sensible customs, others were by no means "utopian" in the popular sense, and they sometimes seem to forecast the twentieth-century nightmare pictures of future states, such as H. G. Wells's (very plausible), or Aldous Huxley's, and the more satirical George Orwell's.

These should not be described as utopias; but the attempts to imagine and describe human communities finer than any known on earth started long before More's, which provided a name for the type, but owed much to Plato's *Republic* (almost the pioneering attempt to describe an imaginary commonwealth) and also his treatment of the *Laws*. But, though Plato set the example, no other writer seems to have equalled More's foresight and wisdom, so that his Utopia is still admirable in this our so troubled age, not only for its social efficiency but also for the prevailing

atmosphere of an ideal democracy, where individual freedom did not clash with but encouraged co-operation. In such humanity More appeals to us in strong contrast to Plato's dictatorial rules.

A little later than More the much tortured and imprisoned Dominican monk, Campanella (1568-1639), wrote his *Civitas Solis,* which showed some influence of Plato (unless he had read More's *Utopia* in its original Latin). The community depicted live in a simple communistic state, but the rulers are priests of the church, and Campanella is imagining a theocracy.

What may be called utopian literature is a big subject, but one more of the influential works, Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (contemporary with Campanella's *Civitas Solis*) mainly expounds, very impressively, the author's conviction of the necessity for scientific research and its practical application in making a new world. But, in spite of this modernity of Bacon's, he fails to convince us of the reality of the citizens of New Atlantis. In this he resembles the majority of would-be utopian prophets.

In spite of the frequent charge that utopias merely express escapist wishes, the best of their authors can be credited with directing attention to the possibilities of improving our muddled world. If the preceding observations are not too incoherent they may provoke others to ask such questions as, Do we know where we are going? and Why? The next step would be to judge the amount and quality of agreement about the answers.

R. L. MEGROZ

FOR this is the bond of men in cities, that all shall rightly preserve the laws.
—EURIPIDES

MAN AND GOD IN THOMAS HARDY

[Our old and esteemed friend, **Mr. H. C. Duffin**, is well known as the author of *Amphibion*, a literary study of Robert Browning, and of *Thomas Hardy* (reviewed in The Aryan Path of February 1964), which has been re-issued in India for the special use of the universities. In this article he writes directly and perceptively of the various aspects of Hardy's attitude to the idea of God. Hardy's doubts were not negative merely. They were the other side of his Aeschylean vision of the sufferings of human beings. Mr. Duffin discusses the whole question with justice.—Ed.]

Thomas Hardy seems to have had a low opinion of God, but a much higher one of man. This does not mean he was a "humanist," a member of that unimaginative sect which makes man into God, which sees man as the end and meaning of life, which says with Whitman, "I believe there is nothing greater than I." The "religion of humanity" is almost a contradiction in terms. Self-worship must be as enervating as self-pity. To Hardy man is no God, but he is at least god-like, worthy of all that Hamlet says about him, and only in a superficial sense "quintessence of dust": often splendid, and always capable of both goodness and greatness. We have come a long way since Hardy, and today Mr. Graham Greene, who, being a Roman Catholic, has presumably an implicit belief in God as the Supreme Being, yet sees man as a poor thing. The highest emotion his characters are capable of waking in us is pity. Mr. Evelyn Waugh, belonging to the same communion, depicts a world lighter-hearted, but no less sordid.

My purpose is not to show any necessary association between worship of God and contempt for man, but it is noticeable that the two greatest novelists since Hardy — Conrad and Charles Morgan — have both been at least unorthodox in their religious opinions and have both peopled their novels with men and women generally admirable, always with a degree of human dignity, and sometimes of heroic stature. Conrad told Cunninghame Graham that if there was a creative power it seemed to him comparable to a huge "knitting-machine"; yet (though he thought little of man as a species) his genius was wiser than his intellect and chose for the specimens of mankind who should tread his fictional stage such memorable figures as "King Tom" Lingard, Lord Jim, Marlow, the wonderful if idealized women, and the still more wonderful and realistic sea-captains. Morgan's picturesquely mystical conception of the universe would not be accepted as "religion" by a member of any established creed, but his world is peopled by great and gracious figures, from Barbet Hazard and Judge Gaskony to Christopher and Mary Terriford in his last play. The proportion of mean or cruel people in either Conrad or Morgan is no larger than one would find among one's own acquaintance.

Hardy was a simpler soul than any of these others, He could not see through the darkness of suffering to a beneficent ruling Providence. But Chesterton's description of Hardy's philosophy as that of "the village atheist brooding over the village idiot" was one of the less brilliant epigrams of that brilliant mind. An atheist is a person who actively disbelieves. He is stupidly indifferent. He does not care whether there is God or not. He "has no use for God." "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." But in Hardy's heart there was no absolute negation. He felt himself forced into disbelief, but there was always a wistful hope, a faint "will to believe," accompanying the sorrowful shake of the head. If someone should say, "Come; see the oxen kneel" on Christmas Eve, he would go, "hoping it might be so." As he hears the song of the Darkling Thrush he senses in it "some blessed Hope" of which he himself is unaware.

It might be thought that Hardy's idea of a supreme being could be gathered from those unique "phantom intelligences" that survey from on high the action of *The Dynasts*: the Spirit of the Years, the Spirit Ironic, the Spirits Sinister, the Spirit of the Pities. But they are no part of Hardy's belief. They are pure inventions, introduced for the purpose of displaying the movements and fate of great armies over vast geographical areas, and of voicing his own comments on the wicked futility of dynastic war. For the true picture of Hardy's views of man and God we turn, for man, to the novels, and, for God, to the poems.

Hardy was not, as he thought, greater as a poet than as a novelist, but in his poems he was able to expose the quivering nerve of his sympathy with suffering humanity (shutting his eyes to the happiness around him) and to castigate whoever might be responsible for the suffering, denominating the "someone" as God, the Will, or It. His favourite conception is of an "Immanent Will," impersonal and unconscious, though it is difficult to see how a being so described could exercise "will." Nevertheless, Hardy's creative mind compels him (especially when he is in a critical mood) to think of this force, this will, in terms much more human than are acceptable today, though natural enough to the more "fundamental" nineteenth century:

> "I have finished another year," said God. . . .
> "And let the last sun down."

In the poem, "God-forgotten," God says that now he has been reminded of the existence of Earth he will do something about its evils. In "God's Education" he is surprised to learn that some of his dealings seem cruel to men, and in "A Dream-question" he refuses to listen to any criticism of his ways by his creatures—

Think some such mystery resides
Within the ethic of my will —

which indeed parallels the Church's explanations, "God moves in a mysterious way," and "His ways are not our ways."

All this is very far from atheism, a mechanistic account of life. The cruel and ironic "fate" that plays so large a part in Hardy's philosophy is the crude result of concentrating the attention on one side of life. When we turn from God to man, one feels that Hardy should have realized something great, even miraculous, in the power that could forge on its anvil a humankind of which Hardy's *personae* must be supposed a cross-section. Of all the major characters in his novels one can remember amazingly few who can be called "bad" — Troy; Alec D'Urberville; Arabella, who seduced, deceived, and degraded Jude — and even these are almost angelic compared with the monsters of Dickens's stage, to say nothing of the depraved figures who are accepted as normal in today's fiction. Is this how Hardy saw the world? Hardly the creation of a mindless, or evil-minded, power. There is no loss of touch with reality. The men are no Scott heroes, the women no Shakespearean heroines, though there are exceptions to this rule. Unromantic as they are, there is no fault that I can find worth censuring in Giles Winterborne, Gabriel Oak, or John Loveday, in Tess, Elizabeth-Jane, or Marty South. All the others — Jude and Henchard, Clym Yeobright and Farmer Boldwood, Sue and Bathsheba and Eustacia — are flawed diamonds, yet still jewels of great price, men and women of such stature that most "actual" people are dwarfed beside them. And nearly all, like the most characteristic of Wordsworth's figures — Michael and Peter Bell, Margaret, the Wanderer and the Waggoner, Poor Susan and Lucy Gray — came straight from nature's workshop, with no social veneer or educational advantages.

Thus generously did Hardy's ironic eye see the men and women he lived among, whom he fathomed to the very bottom of their uttermost being. Surely the implication is that if the Creative Power — call it God, call it the Immanent Will — is capable of conceiving and fashioning beings so splendid, and others far from splendid yet with every degree of delightfulness and interest — then this power must possess in itself qualities of excellence quite majestic. But Hardy will not accept the logic of his imagination. His soul, sensitive to emanations of the numinous, told him God must be there; but his mind, surveying the earthly scene, rejected God. He could not even have fallen in with today's emasculated version of "Christianity without God"; for no one who believed in Christ even as "the son of man" could have written (and written so forcibly) the poem, "Panthera," which shows a Roman soldier on duty at the Crucifixion recognizing the chief victim as his son by an amour with a Jewish

girl thirty years previously. On the other hand he might conceivably have joined that considerable band of Western seekers who accept the teachings of the Buddha, since Buddhism dispenses with the Deity and holds that all life is suffering. The truth is that Hardy was entirely without that spark, or even speck, of mysticism which is necessary to grasp the reality of a transcendental God. Nevertheless we have acquitted him of atheism, and once at least he provides evidence that he had some inkling of the doctrine which Bernard Shaw declared was the only one that could account for the existence of evil — the doctrine of Creative Evolution, of a God evolving with his creation, a God of whom Whitehead could surmise that "there is a process inherent in his nature whereby his infinity is acquiring realization." After all the bitter satire on the Immanent Will and its blind dumb turning of the handle of an idle show, *The Dynasts* ends with the Chorus of the Years sensing a sound of joyance in the air, a feeling of coming deliverance, of

> Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashions
> all things fair!

H. C. DUFFIN

MEN are free beings, living as such, and they learn from inner experience the nothingness of evil, how it defeats and destroys itself while it is being experienced; and when they have purged themselves of it they reach the light.

—BERDYAEV

THE POVERTY OF MODERN ART*

A CATALOGUE OF AESTHETIC PREJUDICES

[**Mr. Arthur L. Herman** has written some stimulating philosophical essays for THE ARYAN PATH. In this long study, of which we print below the first part, he puts forward what is really a searching criticism of the inward sources of modern art. Art is so valuable an aspect of spiritual life that its quality at any period is at once an index to the condition of humanity and an invitation to the most selfless efforts of which we are capable in judging it and, if necessary, purging our attitude to it.—ED.]

I

THE JUDGEMENT OF ART and art criticism are perhaps as old as civilization itself. Men have, I should imagine, always raised the question, "Is this beautiful?" "Why do I like this particular object as opposed to that?" or "Why is this beautiful?" and so forth. One of the earliest historical examples we have of an art critic is taken from the court of Dionysius I (430-367 B.C.), Tyrant of Syracuse. It seems that Dionysius, being a dramatist in addition to being a great patron of the arts, had produced one of his own stagey spectacles, and invited a local reviewer, well known for his critical eye, to appraise the play. The critic came to the palace, the play was put on, and the critic watched. When it was over Dionysius hurried up to the fellow and asked for his appraisal. The man told him what he truly thought of the play, and in a rage Dionysius sentenced him to ten years in the Syracusan granite quarries. When, the story continues, the ten years of horrible labour were over — for you must understand that the granite quarries became the sentence of death for many a younger man, who died miserably cutting and carrying the gigantic blocks of marble to the temples and palaces Dionysius was erecting — when, as I say, the ten years were up for the old man, for he had grown old now, Dionysius invited him back to the palace for another spectacle. He had him fed, bathed, dressed, and perfumed. And, when the old man was plump and in possession of his wits once again, another drama was staged, with the Tyrant, the author, taking keen interest. When it was over, Dionysius rushed to the old reviewer to ask once again for his critical judgement. The old man gave it: "Take me back to the quarries."

Undoubtedly this is not the first recorded critical judgement we have in Western history, but it comes so close in time to the first academic critical appraisal of the arts by Plato of Athens, who was a contemporary

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* The points of view expressed in this paper owe much to the influence of Ray F. Livingston and Ananda K. Coomaraswamy.—A.L.H.

and intimate of Dionysius I, that it would be a strain to discover who uttered such judgements first, Plato or the anonymous old critic of Syracuse. This being the case, and the dates being slightly in our favour — for Dionysius I died twenty years before Plato died, and the last twenty years of Plato's life were rich in literary activity — I should like to nominate this unknown critic for the title of "The Father of Art Criticism." This is one title Plato will surely not miss.

I propose now to analyse this critical judgement made by the founder of the school of art criticism with a view to discovering what it is that made his criticism so poignant and appropriate to the work he was judging: "Take me back to the quarries." What sort of reasoning, what kinds of criteria, underlie this judgement? What presuppositions or prejudices lie buried beneath the critical surface of this appraisal? The answers to these questions will carry us well into our discussion of modern art.

But like all academicians who play at the game of philosophy, I am not going to let you off easily here. Philosophers are fond of making distinctions, of defining terms to make their discussion as concise as possible, and I shall proceed to bore you now with a few definitions. By "art" or "work of art" I shall mean anything made by hand, and for the time being let me exclude natural objects from the category of art, even though the "hand of God" as some say "has writ large His purpose" in the world. Further, let me divide art into two different categories, fine and applied, or secular and sacred, art. Fine art, let me say, is produced with no end or purpose in view but to delight man, to give what some critics call "aesthetic emotion" to man. It is defined in terms of the emotion one feels at being presented with an artistic object such as a painting, a symphony, a poem or any other production made by hand for this purpose. Applied art, on the contrary, is produced for a purpose other than the beholder's or the artist's emotion of pleasure. For example, the purpose or reason for producing the applied-art object might be to make the observer morally good or even religious. It may serve to remind man of his divinity, and not serve sensual delectation. This kind of art, as Plato says, is rational in the sense that the artist is truly inspired in so far as the Spirit informs man and man reproduces as the Spirit dictates. This view of art, the view of what I have called "applied art," is the Platonic view of art, and the view adopted by medievals such as St. Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. It is rational and not emotional, i.e., neither a product nor a producer of emotion, not "aesthetic" in the sense in which we have defined "fine art."

To make this distinction clearer, let us examine the following statement by Plato. He says: "Art imitates nature in her manner of operation,"

Plato means by this that art is an imitation of the nature, the form or the ideal of things, and not of the appearance of things. The artist who is a sacred artist deals with things as they should be and not with things as they are. The secular artist on the other hand deals with things as they are. His incentive for reproducing nature or for reproducing or "expressing" his emotions or feelings in the art object comes from the thing itself or the emotion itself dictating to him. This urge to re-create the things of this world was regarded as blasphemous by the medievals; for a man who reproduced worldly and natural objects was copying God, trying to go one better than the creation by reproducing the appearance of things. Thus what was referred to as "decadent art" would be exemplified by the so-called "Golden Age" of Greece and the imitative productions of the Renaissance, periods when man became more interested in the objects of this world and his own personal reaction to the things in this world than to the manner of nature's operation. If the function or purpose of art is to nourish the better part of man's soul, so the sacred artist might argue, then art which appeals to man's sensibilities and feelings and reminds man only of his animal or sensitive nature is decadent and dishonest. For, to be perfectly frank, the art that the sacred artist deals in is about God or Divinity. The understanding of these works demands an education in a now lost philosophy — a study in ontology and theology, and an insight into man's goal and purpose in life. Therefore, if man does have a double nature, divine and human. sacred and secular, to stress but one side of this nature is dishonest. We are, as Ananda Coomaraswamy has stated, a people cut away from our tradition, a people or culture without goals or purposes, incognizant of our true self; we drift unaffected by our art because it speaks to only half of our being, and even then not too clearly.

But now I have tipped my hand — you can see what my prejudices are and this is very unphilosophical. I should arrive at my conclusion in a more rigorous manner so that the consequences appear suddenly and surprisingly before you and even I should appear to look startled at the results. But perhaps this way is better, for you recognize the metaphysic in which I base my argument, i.e., that the duality of man's nature, of the divine and the human soul that reside within him, is real. So even if you send me back to the quarries you will know at least upon what my judgement of art was based.

With these distinctions out of the way, let me proceed to a criticism of fine art (secular art) or modern art and a discussion of the critical canons upon which that art is based. When the Father of Art Criticism said "Take me back to the quarries" he was making a critical judgement about what he saw. What was this judgement based upon? He watched

the drama, related the work to certain objective or subjective criteria, and pronounced the dread judgement that probably meant his death. We can assume, I think, that "Take me back to the quarries" is equivalent in some rough way to the statement "It's no good," or "It's a bad work of art" or some such negative appraisal. How did he know it was no good? It is here, in reference to the reasons which back up the judgement, that fine art and applied art can once again be distinguished.

You look at a painting (let us use the visual arts for a moment) and you judge it to be good, bad, or indifferent. What makes you do this? You are stimulated perhaps, and moved to say "It's good" or "It's bad," or you are not stimulated and you pass on to another work, hoping your aesthetic sensitivity will allow you a judgement at some future time. Suppose you judge the work "good." You have three roads open to you for supporting this judgement. The first is that the work of art corresponds objectively to what you think a good painting ought to possess; form, balance, unity — there are many words to describe these objective criteria. DeWitt Parker, for instance, refers to such criteria as *elements* in an "organic unity," and he is able to speak of such objective constituents as "the principle of the theme," "thematic variation," "balance and evolution of the theme." But it is apparent to most aestheticians that this is not enough; for a skilled craftsman, they argue, might take these same constituents and very carefully construct a work which embodies all these elements, and yet the work would not necessarily be adjudged "good" (i.e., "beautiful"). A second road is then opened for aesthetic judgement, and this is the subjective criterion for judgement. You judge a work "good" because it moves you, it delights you, it gives you pleasure, aesthetic pleasure. Paintings which do not give you aesthetic pleasure you judge bad (or perhaps indifferent: i.e., a work to be returned to at a later time) or wrong. (It is no accident, I think, that the language of aesthetics and the language of ethics, e.g., "good" and "bad," "wrong" and "right," and the criteria behind these final judgements of artistic works and moral actions are so similar.) This emotionalist or hedonistic theory of art is also found in the third road open to the person who judges a work of art "good," and I will save my criticism of this emotionalist theory until I have finished presenting this third criterion. This third criterion is merely a combining of the first two, the objective and subjective (emotionalist) canons of aesthetic judgement: the person either feels aesthetic pleasure first and then notes its cause in terms of a certain objective arrangement of colour, line, and form in the work of art, or *vice versa*. Since the last two criteria (the subjective and the combinatory) stand or fall by the subjective notion of "aesthetic pleasure," I should like to turn to that notion and attempt to analyse

what it means and how it is used.

Popularly, the psychology of emotional expression has been stated somewhat as follows: the artist is a person of exceptional sensitive abilities. He feels a strong emotion welling up within himself and expresses this emotion in some medium. The viewer or listener comes into contact with the medium and if the work is well constructed, a transfer of emotion is effected, i.e., the viewer feels the same or a similar emotion welling up within himself. This emotion is described as "aesthetic pleasure." The quality of the emotion and its intensity depends on the sensitivity of artist and beholder. But what is the emotion like? Is it like drinking when you are thirsty, or scratching yourself when you itch? Obviously not! These are physical pleasures, and the aesthetic pleasure is not physical. But it does appeal to man's sensitive or human or animal nature, and there is nothing wrong with that as far as I can see.

But we must understand why it is that this kind of pleasure is so important to man. Does it change or alter his values in any sense? Apparently not, to judge from the many "art for art's sake" theories so rife nowadays where it is argued that art has no purpose or goal other than to give pleasure. If when I am thirsty I fail to satisfy my thirst I will die, and in a sense the drive for thirst-satisfaction is important to me, for my life's sake. What happens if the drive for aesthetic pleasure is taken away from me? Apparently some aesthetes would argue that without beauty man would also die, and yet there are millions of people who have never had an aesthetic emotion in their life who seem to "live" in some sense or other. Just how important is that aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic emotion?

Again, for people who feel aesthetic emotion and judge a work of art good on the basis of that emotion, what happens to that judgement if the emotion fails to appear at another later viewing of the same work? We have no guarantee that the judgement will be permanent and lasting, and any criterion that issues in one judgement one day but not the next must be a strange kind of basis on which to judge anything.

In another sense all subjective criteria for a work of art can be reduced to the one single statement: "I like it." This means that judgements like "the work is good or beautiful" are equivalent to nothing more than "I like it." "Peppers are good," for instance, really means "I like peppers." The only way I can explain why I like peppers is to refer to the sensation I receive when I eat them, or think about them. If you don't like peppers there is no way on earth I can get you to like them, contrary to the propaganda pepper-pushers put out on the subject. But, while this only means that aesthetic emotion, or the criterion of aesthetic judgement, is a pretty rough measure of the worthwhileness of a work of art, it certainly is not

a slam at the aesthetes who use it to judge art. The only real reply one can make to the upholders of this criterion when they tell you about their emotion and its qualities is, "So what?" After you have had it what difference does it make, i.e., "Is it worth having and why?"

But I have no real quarrel with these people. I fancy myself aesthetically oriented from time to time. I react pleasurably to Michaelangelo, Rembrandt, Renoir, Van Gogh, and Whistler. They stimulate and prick my sensitive self. They make me feel proud to be a man and live among men. But they do not change my values. All education implies re-evaluation, it seems to me, and I am none the better oriented to my real nature for having been aesthetically titillated. As Plato put it, "Whatever is made only to give pleasure is for the delectation of that part of us that passively submits to emotional storms." The education that art should give ought to be an education to the love for order and a dislike for what is disordered. The separation of utility from beauty, the severing of the useful from the true, is a condition of a disordered society, a society where freedom to create is denied to all but a few and where the dignity of work is lost because man has lost the freedom to create within himself, as every artist should, the order that must come from all real art. Plato had said that art should be a reminder, and a reminder of the order and rationality that mere appearance and emotion can never suggest.

But now I find myself using undefined terminology again, and perhaps I have only confused the issue of which I was originally speaking. I have tried to explain that the subjective criterion of aesthetic judgement, while meaningful on one level of human development, the passional and emotional, does not satisfy man's complete self, because as a canon for aesthetic judgement it is vague and subjective, and because it speaks merely to one side of man's total nature.

In the part that follows, I would like to turn therefore to so-called applied art in an attempt to understand more fully what we mean by its opposite, fine art, and the position fine art holds today.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(To be concluded)

In the elder days of Art,
Builders wrought with greatest care
Each minute and unseen part;
For the Gods see everywhere.

—LONGFELLOW

ABBEY THEATRE

[In the coming autumn, the Abbey Theatre in Dublin (see "The Foundations of the Abbey" in THE ARYAN PATH of January 1964) starts a new career in a new theatre. **Mr. R. M. Fox** takes the occasion to give us a brief review of its significant history.—ED.]

IN THE AUTUMN OF THIS YEAR the new Abbey Theatre, which is rising like a Phoenix — only much more slowly — on the site of the old Abbey, destroyed by fire in 1951, will be officially opened in Dublin. The new theatre will cost £250,000 of public money, besides an annual Government subsidy of £25,000. It will be considerably bigger than the old building; for the directors decided to buy out other premises in the same square block before they began reconstruction.

Yet the National Theatre is not principally a matter of bricks and mortar. The significance of Irish drama to the world — since W. B. Yeats launched the Abbey in 1904 — consisted in the kind of plays to which the theatre gave expression. At the beginning of the century there was a spirit of unrest in European drama. Ibsen had given this a new impetus. In Britain the Ibsen social drama was hailed by some critics, among whom Shaw was the most powerful. This Ibsen wave attacked the old-fashioned drawing-room drama, with its artificial and stilted situations. But many were scandalized by such plays as Ibsen's *Ghosts*.

Yeats was influenced by this new drama. One of his closest associates, George Moore, wrote the first play avowedly dealing with English life in the Ibsen manner. Yet, when Yeats came to consider the kind of plays he wanted for his Irish theatre, he scornfully rejected the whole approach of the naturalistic social drama. Believing passionately in the poetic play, he laid down two main lines for the Abbey to follow. First, he wanted plays about heroic legendary themes, and, secondly, plays about people on the land.

> I hope to get our heroic age into verse [wrote Yeats in his journal *Samhain*]. It is possible that we may have to deal with passing issues until we have re-created the imaginative tradition of Ireland and filled the popular imagination again with saints and heroes.

In the same journal (October 1902) he wrote:

> Our movement is a return to the people like the Russian movement of the early seventies, and the drama of society could but magnify a condition of life which the countryman and the artisan could but copy to their hurt. The play that is to give them a quite natural pleasure should either tell them of their own life or of that life of poetry, where every man can see his own image, because there alone does human nature escape from arbitrary conditions. . . . Plays about drawing-rooms are written for the middle classes

> of great cities, for the classes who live in drawing-rooms, but if you would uplift the man of the roads you must write about the roads, or about the people of romance or about great historical people.

He rejected Edward Martyn's *The Tale of a Town* on the ground that it was about the middle class and dealt with Irish life in the Ibsen manner. He dismissed Ibsen's social plays contemptuously as being about "town councils and drains." Edward Martyn was a generous man who would have helped the Abbey financially if Yeats had not repulsed him.

Another conflict over Abbey drama arose when Yeats declared that he wanted to bring the ancient heroes of legend on to the stage. Standish O'Grady, a famous writer of legendary romances, expressed his horror at having the heroes of the Red Branch cycle of legends, with their feasting, fighting, and lusting, brought into the Irish theatre. "The Red Branch ought not to be staged," he cried in his *All-Ireland Review*. "Leave the heroic cycles alone and don't bring them down to the crowd."

His attitude provoked G. W. Russell (AE) to jump into the arena with a passionate plea for democracy:

> The ancient heroes [he declaimed] did not belong to any small exclusive section but to the whole people. They were part of the national heritage. The nobility and courage expressed in the pagan legends of the past would surely find new expression suited to the needs of our own time. The wild riders have gone forth and their labours in the human mind are only just beginning. They will do their deeds over again and now they will act through many men and speak through many voices. The spirit of Cuchulain will stand at many a lonely place in the heart and he will win, as of old, against multitudes.

The aristocratic Yeats was opposed by the still more aristocratic Standish O'Grady, and supported by his friend George Russell, on unimpeachable democratic grounds. But what they all seemed to agree on was that the Ibsen drama of social reality had no place in the Irish theatre. So the Abbey Theatre was launched, and Yeats guided it on the path of poetic drama. His actors were encouraged to speak quietly and to stand still except when the drama called for movement.

They learned that lesson so well that the first great triumph of the Abbey came when they visited London. The London critics, accustomed to strutting and declaiming on the West End stage, rose enthusiastically to these Irish amateurs, as they then were. For all that, the poetic drama and the peasant play, called for by Yeats, did not satisfy the needs of the changing times. Synge satirized this in his *Playboy of the Western World*. Lennox Robinson, for many years the young Manager of the Abbey, made further dents in the Abbey tradition. His *Church Street*, a typically sedate middle-class play which the Abbey has recently revived, is a

good example of his dry, exact, realistic work. But it was Sean O'Casey who — in 1923 — began that series of Dublin-tenement plays which changed the whole character of the Abbey. After that it was no longer possible to pour the new wine into the old bottles.

Since that time there seems to have been a loss of direction in Abbey drama. Complaints have been frequent about the triviality of plays in recent years, especially since the old Abbey went up in flames. On the Abbey side it is urged that the expense of production in a bigger theatre, occupied on a temporary basis, makes it impossible to maintain earlier artistic standards. Yeats, it is said flatly, is no longer good box-office. O'Casey quarrelled with the Abbey and would not allow his plays to be staged.

What is the situation now? The Abbey will return to its own larger theatre in the autumn. It is intended then to bring Yeats's poetic drama back to the theatre to mark the centenary year of the distinguished founder. We shall know then whether these plays have really lost their hold on the new Abbey audience. There are protesting voices demanding a return to poetic drama.

A strong recommendation was made to the Government that the theatre should be nationalized and an artistic director appointed. (At present it is a private company, subsidized and with Government representation on the board.) Instead, the Government has decided to give twenty-five people — distinguished figures in the Irish theatre — thirty shares each in the new Abbey, with the idea that they may influence policy. But even if they were all agreed they would still hold a minority of shares.

No-one seems to know what they will — or should — advise. The only certainty is that, when the Abbey company of tried and experienced players move into their new theatre, they will need to find new and dramatic expression for the new Ireland that has grown up around them since their theatre was destroyed by fire.

R. M. Fox

THE SOUL

The substance of soul
    Is emptiness;
    Void, nothingness, loneliness.
This is the substance of soul.

The essence of life
    Is fullness;
    Activity, object, fruitfulness.
This is the essence of life.

The agony of soul
    Is its meeting with life.
    The filling it,
    Feeding it, changing....
This is the agony of soul.

This is the terrible agony of soul.

VIVIAN WORTHINGTON

THE SPIRIT

The angel-essence of Soul
    Meets the turbulence of life
    And is in agony
    Lest
    "Heaven's dewdrop, dropped on
        earth,
    Become a piece of clay...
    The pearl a speck of mire."

"The mighty magic of Prakriti"
    Weaves its potent spell
    And is in agony
    Lest
    The light desert it quite,
    Because a distant star...
    The Bridegroom an unheeding god.

Pains of birth are these,
    Quite forgotten
    When beginningless Spirit
    Knows itself in the *Yajna,*
    The immolation of angel-essence
    To wake the seven sleepers
    In every Atom;
    When beginningless Spirit
    Knows itself in the *Dana,*
    The offering of Prakriti's powers
    To make a mirror for the soul;
    When beginningless Spirit
    Knows itself in the *Tapas,*
    The exquisite proportion and
        happy order
    Of soul and sense,
    Which is perfect Austerity.

In "the nature, stature, and dignity
    Of conscious godhood"
    The-Drop-in-the-Ocean-
    And-the-Ocean-in-the-Drop
    Is not in agony:
    Sat-Chit-Ananda!

R. S.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TWO STUDIES IN NON-VIOLENCE*

THE FIRST of these two books was written originally as a thesis at the University of Toronto, Canada, where the author was Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy on a grant from the Alfred Kordelin Foundation, Helsinki, from 1959 to 1961. It is a continuation of the study of non-violence which Unto Tahtinen began in India in 1954 and pursued for four years there — his earlier acquaintance with Gandhi's writings having excited his interest in the subject.

The second was written first, being his thesis for a PH.D. at Banaras University. The Gandhi Memorial Fund, New Delhi, enabled him to pursue his studies in India from 1955 to 1959 by a scholarship and the Finnish Council of Humanities, Helsinki, made it possible for him to complete his studies by a further grant.

While in India Unto Tahtinen travelled widely, living in Gandhian *ashrams*, meeting people, working in libraries. He was attached to Vinoba Bhave's *grāmdān* camp on three separate occasions. Making his way slowly through what was, in the beginning, a welter of languages, he studied both the theory and practice of non-violence. From the Indian village he went to the backwoods of Canada, living and working with lumberjacks, than whom a rougher and stronger type of man would be difficult to find.

Serious, sturdy, tenacious, Unto Tahtinen has done work the importance of which has been recognized by the institutions which have helped him. It is high time the layman also became acquainted with the results of his studies. Both these books should be compulsory reading in schools and homes.

The second book, in which Mr. Tahtinen studies non-violence as an ethical principle in Indian thought, interprets the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi in terms of ancient Indian traditions, and points out the similarities and differences between them, should be read first.

The Theories of Punishment recapitulates its findings in the early chapters. This is valuable for people concerned only with penology and criminology, to whom a wider interest in non-violence may seem unnecessary. It makes the book self-contained.

Love, forgiveness, non-violence, or whatever name and content we want to give to the central moral principle, have all been discussed from time to time; yet injurious theories of punishment have been and are both defended and practised. This is contradictory and irrational. Theories advocating injurious punishment seem to be false because they are irreconcilable with moral principles and because there are indications that they are accepted on false and emotional grounds. Non-violent theories of punishment seem to be true because their consistency with moral principles can hardly be shaken and because there also seems to be reason to think they are socially more practical. Psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and social policy have all developed to a point where they can throw light upon the ethics of punishment and change our attitude to offenders. It is obvious

* *The Theories of Punishment: Studied from the Point of View of Non-violence* (152 pp. 1963); *Non-violence As an Ethical Principle: With Special Reference to the Views of Mahatma Gandhi* (192 pp. 1964). Both by UNTO TAHTINEN. (Turku University Press; Academic Book Shop, Helsinki, Finland.)

now that an offender can be reformed by means other than suffering. Unto Tahtinen's definition of democracy lends special pertinence to the problem. He writes: "Democracy is a social order where injurious punishments are not used in furthering political ends."

We cannot be too careful. The terrible practice of burning heretics alive at a stake originated in the ban against the shedding of blood imposed by the Church as a measure of mercy. Therefore, on p. 74 of *Non-violence As an Ethical Principle,* where Tahtinen states that Gandhi sanctioned the use of "unattached violence" in a few cases where a person or an animal is sick and abnormal, I would like to suggest that the qualifying adjectives "hopelessly" and "incurably" be added. Otherwise we may find ourselves in the position of the German soldiers who, after fighting loyally for their country, returned home to find their retarded children gone. Hitler also felt no compunction about emptying insane asylums of their pitiful occupants.

One of the twelve chapters in *Non-violence As an Ethical Principle* is devoted to the study of "*Himsā* and *Niskāma Karma*" or "unattached violence." It does not make any difference to the person or animal injured whether the injury is inflicted dispassionately or in a passionate rage. It does not matter to a man shot whether the man who shoots him is black or white or red or green, Asian or European or American. He is shot.

In the detached and impersonal (*niṣkāma*) use of violence is there a hint of cold-blooded cruelty? Cold-blooded cruelty is the most criminal kind, legally, and morally. An act of violence committed under the influence of sudden passion can evoke our sympathy to some extent, but one committed in cold blood, with cool calculation, is inexcusable. The only detached and impersonal use of violence that can be justified is that of a doctor who causes pain in order to cure, not to punish. The welfare of the person on whom pain is inflicted is the major consideration and should never be lost sight of.

The idea of *ahiṃsā* is, etymologically, of great age. It is and has always been extensively applied in India by intuitive methods. It is regarded by many as a kind of mystique concerned more with the moral good of the individual practising it than with the good of those on whom it is practised. Gandhi was the first to apply it in a rational and organized way to social and political problems on a national or international scale. Many, in India and abroad, have been impressed by the novelty and efficacy of his methods of dealing with disputes. These methods were *ad hoc* applications of the principle of *ahiṃsā* to specific problems. He was a practical philosopher. For this reason they cannot be imitated and were, in his lifetime, baffingly unpredictable. To understand them it is necessary to go to the roots of *ahiṃsā* in Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist thought. It is not enough to study only what Gandhi himself wrote. The wellsprings of his actions go very deep. His ethics are not novel, but in him we see a new combination of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist practical philosophy steeped in Western thought. Hence its importance for the world today.

Man is confronted with the choice between peace and total destruction. No greater challenge has come to him in the course of human history. Individually and in comparatively small social, racial or political groupings, man has made his choice between life and death over and over again in every generation. The challenge is not new. What is new is its magnitude. Mankind as a whole is threatened with extinction, perhaps all life. The earth may become a planet as dead as the moon, a place where no life exists or can exist.

Ahiṃsā is closely linked with the problem of lasting peace; for it is, essentially, a technique of human relations. It shows us how to deal with each

other and other forms of life. Truth is not always easy to ascertain. Though Gandhi uses the word very freely he is humble about it. When in doubt, he says, let *ahiṃsā* guide you. "What is the truth?" is a question constantly in his mind.

William James wrote:

> The first care of diplomatists and monarchs and all those who wish to rule or influence is, accordingly, to find out their victim's strongest principle of self-regard so as to make that the fulcrum of all appeals.

Every person, every people, however primitive, has the self-respect without which existence is not possible. That self-respect is based upon an attitude embodied in their traditions, their culture, their history, their archetypal characters. An essential part of the preparation necessary for the effective use of *ahiṃsā* is a thorough study of the opponent's background. Patterns of response are established in childhood which continue to guide the adult and the nation. These patterns inculcate certain inhibitions. The maintenance of those inhibitions is a part of the individual's self-regard. Some patterns of response exclude recourse to violence, others sanction it to a limited extent as shown in the ethical code of, say, an English gentleman or a Japanese Samurai. Without a knowledge of the inhibitions of the person with whom we are dealing it is not possible to appeal to them or make his self-regard the fulcrum of our approach to his problem.

The simplicity of Gandhi's language should not deceive anybody. To put his theories into practice is a task requiring patient and unending study and resourcefulness. We find the beginnings of this study in these two books. No theoretic consideration is valid that seeks to withhold love, opportunity, or succour from a person because he or she is an untouchable, an offender against social codes, or a Jew, or has a dark complexion.

What is universally true is that a soft answer turneth away wrath. It is always beneficial to oppose gently, not strongly, in order to make the person in trouble aware of his own goodness, his mercifulness, his magnanimity. Strong opposition makes him aware of his power.

This is the wisdom of Solomon (XVIII, 1.2) as explained in the Bible. It is written:

> But it befell the righteous also to make trial of death and a multitude were stricken in the wilderness: howbeit the wrath endured not for long. For a blameless man hasted to be their champion: bringing the weapon of his own ministry, even prayer and the propitiation of incense, he withstood the indignation and set an end to the calamity, shewing that he was thy servant. And he overcame the anger, not by strength of body, not by efficacy of weapons; but by word did he subdue the minister of punishment, by bringing to remembrance oaths and covenants made with the fathers. For when the dead were already fallen in heaps one upon another, standing between he stopped the advancing wrath and cut off the way to the living.

LILA RAY

The Crest Jewel of Wisdom (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*). Attributed to SHANKARA ACHARYA. Translated by CHARLES JOHNSTON. (John M. Watkins, London. 104 pp. 1964. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Important and welcome indeed is this slender volume, which contains the kernel of the mystical side of Shankara's vast production. In addition, the work is attractively constructed, well translated, and handsomely produced. "Know thine own Self as partless Light" (p. 44): the message of the Advaita non-dualist vision is here expressed in a multitude of such phrases. Written for those seeking liberation from self, its tyranny, its fragmenting distortions, the *Crest Jewel,* after an Invocation, presents a young disciple seeking such help from a Master. The Master expounds

the Wisdom, the disciple makes occasional responses, till at length ("The Disciple Attains" pp. 73ff.) the ecstasy of liberation breaks into passionate (if also "passion"-less) song. "Like the shining ether, I endure through ages.... I am shoreless like the ocean" (p. 75). The Master follows with a long summing-up, which indeed (p. 83) swerves into the typical Indian "beyond":

> Both bondage and liberation from bondage are built up by Glamour, and have no true being in the Self.... [There is] neither seeker for liberation nor liberated....

A brief coda concludes this preaching of the "secondless Eternal."

Shankara develops two parallel teachings: from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad,* the division of the four bodies (physical, subtile, causal, and the Spirit) and, from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* the doctrine of the five vestures (those formed of food, vital breath, mind, intelligence, and bliss). In a useful Appendix Dr. Johnston comments on these and offers parallels from à Kempis and other Christian devotional writers. Quotations from the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* are given in full.

Shankara's text moves smoothly from point to point on this truly optimistic (and, in a strict sense, non-ascetic) path. We meet much of the lovely Indian imagery frequently used for these themes: from

> Mind is the name of the mighty tiger that hunts in the forest glades of sensuous things (p. 34)

we ascend to the larva who,

> putting way all other activity, meditating on the bee, enters into the being of the bee; so the seeker for union, meditating on the reality of the supreme Self, enters therein through steadfastness in the one. (p. 58)

This book comprises *multum in parvo* indeed.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Studies in the Tantras and the Veda. By M. P. PANDIT. (Ganesh and Co., Madras. 146 pp. 1964. Rs. 6.00)

This book consists mainly of critical review notices of some studies in the Veda. The author is fully steeped in Tāntric lore, having already to his credit valuable studies like his book on Kundalini Yoga. Besides he is a deep scholar of the Vedas. Consequently these critical surveys are illuminating, well-informed, and valuable to any student as a reliable guide to a deeper study of the Tantra and the Veda.

The opening article is a review of a book entitled *Principles of Tantra,* being itself a masterly survey, encyclopaedic in its nature, of the vast subject of the Tantras. Our author presents the salient points in a clear and brief summary, among which the catholicity of the *Tantra-śāstra,* its easy applicability to all classes and types of human beings, its practicability, its appeal to the votaries of life on earth and its enjoyments, and its efficacy in this Kali Yuga are specially noteworthy. The *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra,* the second book reviewed by our author, gives the essence of the Wisdom and Teaching of the *Tantra Āgamas.* Some spiritual gems from the religious literature of ancient India are next dealt with; among them the *Lalitā Sahasranāma* hymn, the *Uttara-Gītā,* the *Rauragama,* and the *Maṇḍala,* from the Tantras; and the *Puruṣa-sūkta* and *Gāyatrī Upāsana* from the Vedas.

There are, in addition, two valuable chapters on the *Guru-śiṣya* tradition and the six lotuses in Shri-Aurobindo's Yoga; further there are two interesting studies, of the relation of Śaṅkarācārya to the Tāntric tradition and of the relation of Indian culture to the Tantras.

The handling of the subject is masterly, the exposition is lucid and profound,

and the information provided is scholarly and accurate. On the whole this is a rare book precious alike to scholar and student.

D. GURUMURTI

Majmu'a-i-Tafāsīr Abu Muslim Isfahāni. Collected and edited by SYED NASIR SHAH and RAFIULLAH. (Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, Pakistan. 192 pp. 1964. Rs. 3.50)

This is a collection of the extant portions of the comments of Isfahāni on various verses of the *Koran* from the voluminous commentary of Imam Fakhruddin Razi. The editors should be congratulated on their hard work in the collection and translation of these.

Isfahani (A.H. 254-232) is the famous rationalist who, like other rationalists (*Mu'tazila*), took a rational view of various passages of the *Koran* and rejected in the light of reason all the spurious traditions and mythological views expressed about it. It is a pity that owing to the persecution of the *Mu'tazila* all the works of Isfahani are lost to the world. This attempt of the editors is laudable.

M. AJMAL KHAN

The Problem of Method. By JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated from the French with an Introduction by HAZEL E. BARNES. (Methuen and Company Ltd., London. 181 pp. 1963. 30*s*.)

What is exciting here is not so much the thesis, as the copiousness, novelty, brilliance, and audacity of the historical and literary illustration. To a non-Marxist one half of the thesis, indeed, is not exciting at all. Its defence of a man's freedom as against Marxian determinism might often seem little different from, say, Isaiah Berlin's in *Historical Inevitability*. Even in a deterministic sequence each determined event must itself determine; moreover, to grant determinism is still not to grant prophecy. So a particular man, in his living actuality, is more than an expendable symbol of cosmic determinism especially self-expressive in economic determinism. Not questioning his capacity for free choice, and bent on realizing his projects in his felt future, a man feels that he is as much the maker of history as its resultant. As an existentialist, indeed, Sartre might have been expected to insist that history does not at all make a man, but rather provokes a man to exercise his free choice to make himself. What, however, Sartre does impressively reiterate is the formative influence on a man not merely of the historical economic order, but of his early family life, of his engulfment in a state with all its reasons of state, of the indeterminate diversity of his social affiliations, of an infinity of conditions making for an end which in a godless world no one can know.

But while anxious that Neo-Marxism should become sane and wholesome by assimilating a respect for existentialist freedom, Sartre would still look to the sovereignty of such a reformed Marxism as indispensable to that expulsion of poverty without which a man's freedom must be precarious.

> I consider Marxism the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond. . . .
>
> As soon as there will exist *for everyone* a margin of *real* freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have outlived its span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. But we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no concrete experience which allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this philosophy.

Certainly this half of the thesis is exciting from an existentialist. For, what of a man's freedom in so far as in his existence he precedes and makes his essence? But Sartre says: "I do not like to talk about existentialism." He resents

having an intellectual quest rigidly defined, and thereby reduced to "something like a brand of soap — in other words, an idea." What, however, becomes of philosophy without univocally expressed ideas?

M. KAYE

Dostoevsky: A Theological Study. By EDUARD THURNEYSEN. Translated by KEITH R. CRIM. (The Epworth Press, London. 84 pp. 1964. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

There were a number of massive and uncanny prophets in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century, foretelling the plight of Western man in the decades that were to come. One of the strangest and most powerful was Dostoevsky. This enigmatic man, whose life of physical suffering and personal disorder seems to contrast with his extraordinary religious insight, yet put his finger upon the spiritual plight of whole nations who were to come. Eduard Thurneysen, whose small yet packed book was first published in German in 1921, and is here translated into English for the first time, manages to convey what Dostoevsky had to say through his novels.

Briefly it is: The idea of a Creator God who willed the universe into existence and sustains it every moment in time has vanished from the minds of millions of people. Consequently it seems that there is nothing greater than man's own nature in the universe. This leaves him in full possession of what once belonged to the Creator God. Man has taken the place of God.

This places man in a position of intolerable loneliness, for he knows that he is not God and that he can never become so. And a universe without God, even without a God, as it were, who never was, is not the same place as a universe with God. Among other things it forces man to live within his own nature, and according to Dostoevsky, this is hell, and leads to a social hell.

Eduard Thurneysen with brilliant insight emphasizes this dilemma with a critical appreciation, mostly of Dostoevsky's novels, and discloses the novelist's solution.

E. G. LEE

Norwegian Folk Tales. From the collection of PETER CHRISTIAN ASBJÖRNSEN and JÖRGEN MOE. Translated by PAT SHAW IVERSEN and CARL NORMAN. Illustrated by ERIK WERENSKIOLD and THEODOR KITTELSEN (Dreyers Vorlag, Oslo; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 188 pp 1960. Norwegian *kr*.39.; 35*s*.); *Folktales of Norway*. Edited by REIDAR TH. CHRISTIANSEN. Translated by PAT SHAW IVERSEN. (Folktales of the World. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. xlv+284 pp. 1964. 28*s*.).

When I was asked to write a few words about a book of Norwegian Folk Tales in English, I assumed the book to be the first of the two mentioned above. When it arrived, however, it proved to be a different book altogether. Far from overlapping with the first book, the new one is in every way an extension of it. It therefore seems reasonable to introduce both books together.

The most striking difference is the absence of illustrations in the *Folktales of Norway*—if we exclude some highly irrelevant Vikings on the dust cover—and the wealth of beautifully reproduced drawings by Erik Werenskiold and Theodor Kittelsen in the *Norwegian Folk Tales*. Werenskiold and Kittelsen are the undisputed masters of the many Norwegian artists who have been inspired by Norwegian folk tales, and it is difficult to see how anything could convey more of the spirit of Norway than these drawings. The thirty-six folk tales selected are also among the best and most popular of the Asb-

jörnsen and Moe collection, and Pat Shaw Iversen provides a short and efficient sketch of the background to these tales, which form the staple diet of all Norwegian children and surely could not fail to appeal to any child anywhere in the world and of any age. For the general reader, then, this is the book to go for.

Folktales of Norway, edited by Th. Christiansen, a leading Norwegian expert in the field of folklore, is the specialist's book, systematic in its approach and dealing with legends rather than folk tales. There are only seventeen *eventyr* or folk tales proper included, here called "fictional folktales." These occupy 112 pages, as compared with about 140 pages of legends. Most of the fictional folk tales are taken from Asbjörnsen and Moe's collections, whereas only a small percentage of the legends stem from Asbjörnsen's *Norske Huldre-eventyr og Folkesagn,* usually in the shape of small fragments torn from their context and rearranged according to motif. This is a perfectly legitimate procedure, of course, since the topic here is *legends* and not Asbjörnsen's way of *presenting* legends.

Outside Asbjörnsen, the material has been drawn from many sources, and it is most welcome to have in English such a wide selection of Norwegian folk-legend material. In addition, there is a most useful glossary explaining the most esoteric terms, many of which—I think wisely in a book of this kind—have been retained in Norwegian in the translations, e.g., *nisse, tusse, tunkall, gardvord, seter.*

The bibliography for some reason only mentions an 1844 edition of Andreas Faye's *Norske Folke-Sagn,* although the first and very important edition of 1833 is referred to in the Introduction (p. xxii). That Asbjörnsen and Moe's *Norske Folke-eventyr* is dated in 1652 on p. 214 is a slip of small importance. What irritates a Norwegian, but what will probably not worry most readers of this book, is the sprinkling of spelling errors in words in so-called Norwegian: *Krokkeleiva* for *krokleiva* (p. 5); *Kjonder* for *kjender* (p. 164); *khaerringer* for *kjærringer* (p. 206); *thaandbog* for *haandbog* (p. 264) and *setertradjsion* for *setertradisjon* (p. 265), to mention a few. There is, of course, a perfectly simple way of avoiding most of such mistakes, namely to let a native read the proofs, but publishers will, no doubt, ignore this advice and go on hoping for the best, which is as a rule just not good enough.

To sum up, then: if your interests are fundamentally literary, begin with Asbjörnsen and Moe: *Norwegian Folk Tales*; if fundamentally scholarly, *Folktales of Norway.* But the former can probably tell you more about Norway intuitively than all the scholarship of the latter.

TORBJÖRN STÖVERUD

More Highland Folktales. Gathered orally by R. MACDONALD ROBERTSON. Edited by JEREMY BRUCE-WATT. (Oliver and Boyd, London. 164 pp. Illustrated. 1964. 21*s.*)

Folklore may be compiled either with the scrupulous approach of the scholar or, with more freedom, be presented with some artistic embellishment in the collector's style of writing and, even, interpretation. Both methods have their place. After all, folk tales always did receive something from the interpretation of the particular teller. They are a spoken form. Even to record them on paper seems to change them—as a butterfly is changed when it too is pinned down, and as James Hogg's mother told Sir Walter Scott a century and a half ago when he wrote down the ballads she was reciting for him.

While we know what Mrs. Hogg meant, we may nevertheless be grate-

ful to Sir Walter Scott and his many successors for having preserved for us so much that would otherwise have been lost.

Although there is quite a lot of pleasant and interesting material in Mr. Macdonald Robertson's book, it is hardly presented with sufficient style to be interpretative, and is rather too casual to be scholarly. The compiler does not give adequate chapter and verse for the sources of his tales, which are an odd assembly of ghost stories, folklore, and tales that do not properly come under that heading, not all of which are even set in the Scottish Highlands. It is a sort of lucky dip, a rag-bag of material, with here and there something engrossing and a good deal more that is entertaining, but the total effect is rather mixed.

GEORGE SCOTT-MONCRIEFF

The Science of Science: Society in the Technological Age. Edited by MAURICE GOLDSMITH and ALAN MACKAY. (Souvenir Press Ltd., London. 235 pp. 1964. 30*s*.).

J. D. Bernal published his prophetic book *The Social Function of Science* in 1939. He foresaw vast expansions of technical knowledge—certain to come before long, and likely to be hastened by the impact of unavoidable war. He was quick to recognize the dominant role that science must soon play, for good or ill, in human affairs. Nuclear physics, molecular biology, and electronics (with all the possibilities of automation) were due for immense development. Man's power over nature was about to increase in a way that would make the progress of the past look feeble.

Bernal's concern was that men should appreciate the extent of the power that was coming to them; and, above all, that they should be ready to use it constructively when it came. He realized that scientific power could be effectively wielded only if the nature of scientific activity was thoroughly investigated. Science itself—its organization, application, motivation, financial needs, and working methods—had to become the subject of quantitative, scientific study. We needed to have a science of science; just as we already had, in economics, a science of business. Bernal, twenty-five years ago, took the first step towards founding this new discipline; which might make science self-conscious and self-critical, for the greater good of man.

The book under review—with its contributions from fifteen eminent men of science—looks back at Bernal's predictions in the light of what has happened since, and examines the advances made in the science of science that he started. The matters discussed include: the supply and training of scientists: priorities in research, in both advanced and underdeveloped countries; the communication of scientific knowledge, not only among scientists but also between the scientist and the layman; international co-operation; moral and public responsibilities of the scientist; differences of attitude in East and West; scientific problems of the future; industrial science; the economics of research and development; science as an element in refined culture. The quality of thought is that which may be expected from writers of great distinction. The book should be of first-rate interest and importance to anyone concerned about the social implications of science—that is, to all thinking people at the present time.

LEWIS HULL

A World Elsewhere: Voluntary Service Overseas. By MORA DICKSON. With Illustrations by the Author. (Dennis Dobson, London. 216 pp. Illustrated. 1964. 30*s*.)

Voluntary Service Overseas was

launched by Alec and Mora Dickson in 1958 with the despatch from Britain of ten eighteen-year-old school-leavers to Sarawak, three to Nigeria, and two to Ghana. These pioneers were only the first of a rapidly increasing flow of British boys and, a little later, girls (average age eighteen or nineteen) to do a year's voluntary service in under-developed countries. The first year's working of VSO has been described by Mrs. Dickson in a previous book, *A Season in Sarawak*; here she deals with the next two and a half years from August 1959. The story is told largely by the volunteers themselves through extracts from their letters, with a linking commentary and a profusion of line-drawings by the author.

The majority of the volunteers were engaged on teaching jobs, though others helped in administration as Assistant District Commissioners and a few apprentices took on technical assignments. Their leisure hours and holidays were often used for more self-imposed social work, as well as for tours of exploration with their pupils and visits to their families. All of them felt that this year overseas was the most satisfying, thrilling, and worth while of their lives. They speak with refreshing directness and honesty, not minimizing or covering up their failures any more than their successes. There is an interesting consensus of opinion on the meaning of the word "under-developed," which, together with a total lack of race prejudice, indicates a real advance in human values. We may be proud of these "teenagers" who did a man's job with remarkable courage, responsibility, and restraint.

Nevertheless, some questions should be asked about the purpose and concept of schemes like VSO. Has the export of British-type sport, scouting, and youth-clubs any real value for a struggling new country? By what right do we send inexperienced eighteen-year-olds to teach and administer in the most delicate and complex situations, while here at home we cannot teach the A B C to an infant without a three-year training? Our standards certainly need some adjustment, though this may not be all in our own favour — as these volunteers so clearly saw.

MARGARET TIMS

The Permissive Morality. By C. H. WHITELEY and WINIFRED M. WHITELEY. (Methuen and Company Ltd., London. 143 pp. 1964. 15*s*.)

Dr. Whiteley and his wife pose far more questions than they answer in this compact discussion of some of the problems of the modern age. The permission to which they refer is shown in the tolerance of conduct which would have been publicly condemned a few years ago; the surrender of individual responsibility; the lost respect for elders; and the attempt to understand, rather than to condemn, the criminal. Much of the slackening of censure may arise from inner guilt and the desire to justify in ourselves the conduct we allow in others; much of it comes from the economic levelling of the classes. The moneyed classes are no longer regarded as born leaders nor the poorer classes blamed for their poverty. Tradition does not suffice to justify anything except ceremonial and, as the authors say, when tradition loses its force, fashion takes over. Nowadays the masses follow the current fashion set by the mass media, and are content to let the scientists and economists grapple with the real problems of the day. But science and economics deal only with the facts of a situation and ignore moral values. Moral codes, indeed, make only for frustration in a free society—but the absence of codes makes for bewilderment, and bewilderment is the lot of many young people today, while the upholders of standards, who are the real rebels of this age, are condemned as "squares." A restoration of public standards and of a

purpose in life for individuals are the most urgent needs of today, for which the authors feel the main hope must still lie in education.

FRANK DAWTRY

On Historiography: A Study of Methods of Historical Research and Narration of J. N. Sarkar, G. S. Sardesai, and P. K. Gode. By S. R. TIKEKAR. (Popular Prakashan, Bombay. xiii+71 +8 pp. 1964. Rs. 6.00)

During the last two decades there has been a spate of new sciences and these new entrants are being hailed by established academies. One of these newcomers is historiography — the science behind the science of history.

In this book the author expounds the scope and importance of historiography, and illustrates his points with examples from the researches of three eminent historians: Jadu Nath Sarkar, G. S. Sardesai, and P. K. Gode. It is shown how the history we read is the end product of a long process of trial and error, of patient sifting of evidence, of checks and cross checks, of verification of persons, places, and periods. We learn that many original MSS., on which history is based, present riddles to the conscientious historian owing to the babble of languages, jumble of scripts, vagaries of calendars, and confusion of names relating to places and persons. It is instructive to see how these "authorities" are strictly screened and subjected to rigid tests before being accepted.

The whole procedure, carried on behind the scenes, is fascinating to an inquiring mind. It is like a visit to a handloom shed where one watches the craftsman blending the warp and the woof into intelligible and attractive patterns.

Shri Tikekar deserves thanks for introducing this aspect of research to the average reader. An experienced journalist, a versatile writer, and a popular broadcaster, he has the additional advantage of having been personally associated with all the three historians whose methods he has cited to illustrate his thesis.

The book is attractively got up, and has several illustrations and facsimiles of handwritings, as also an Index.

N. R. DEOBHANKAR

The Story of Early Indian Civilization. By GERTRUDE EMERSON SEN. Illustrated by EDITH EMERSON. (Orient Longmans, Bombay. 294 pp. 1964. Rs. 6.00).

This excellent publication, eminently suitable as a textbook for students, is in fact an abridged and revised version of *The Pageant of India's History,* Vol. I, originally published by Longmans, Green and Co., Inc. (New York, 1948). Sympathetically and intelligently written, it makes pleasant reading. Understandably enough, the author's India is undivided, i.e. "India before a part was cut away to form Pakistan" (p. 1). Commenting on the continuity of her culture in sharp contrast with many a great civilization, now extinct, like the Greek and the Roman, she rightly points out:

> In India, for untold centuries, the aspirations and ideas of the Hindus, expressed through religion, art, music, literature, manners, and the peculiar structure of their society, have maintained creative vitality. The link with the past has never been destroyed, in spite of all the vicissitudes of history. Even the divergent faiths emerging on Indian soil from time to time, such as Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, are offshoots sprung from the ancient stem. They are basically reform movements, rather than new religions. (pp. 4-5)

We cordially endorse her view:

> Giving, taking, borrowing, assimilating,

creating, India has come to be what she is, perhaps the most provocative and fascinating country in the world (p. 6).

The history is traced from the remotest past down to the medieval period. It is divided into fifteen convenient chapters, the last two dealing with "Indian Culture Beyond the Seas" and "Indian Culture Beyond the Mountains." Chapter VI on "The First Indian Empire" is particularly illuminating. One reads in it a detailed narrative of the military exploits of Alexander the Great in the north-west of India as also of the administrative system under the Mauryas.

Alexander's meteoric flash across the Indian sky [observes the author], so impressive to the Greek, was scarcely noted by India. His name is not even mentioned in the whole of contemporary Indian literature (p. 56).

This complaint of hers, it is fervently to be hoped, will one day be obviated by a sudden discovery, literary or archaeological. The history of India is still in the process of reconstruction, and striking pieces of evidence do come up freshly now and then, such as a stone inscription of Asoka, purely in Greek, from Kandahar, yet to be noticed by our author. The vast Jaina literature, mostly still unstudied, holds out a good promise, too.

In an undertaking like the present one, some mistakes of omission and commission are unavoidable. The author's allusion to "a few stone *yupa*-posts, once used in sacrificial Vedic rites," as "tangible remains of Indo-Aryan cuture between 2000 and 500 B.C." (p. 25) is wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, the *yupas* used in Vedic sacrifices were of wood only; and these of stone discovered in India and Indonesia are only commemorative ones, some with Sanskrit inscriptions and some blank, but all dating later than the second or third century A.D.

The fine illustrations and maps as well as the fairly exhaustive Bibliography and the Index at the end all add to the usefulness of the book.

B. CH. CHHABRA

Beyond Empire. By ESME WINGFIELD-STRATFORD. (Phoenix House, London. 360 pp. 1964. 35*s*.)

Great Britain is passing through a profound crisis of soul after the loss of her empire, particularly of India, the brightest jewel in her imperial crown.

Opinion is deeply divided between two trends—one towards an all-out European Union, political, cultural, and economic, and the other towards a dogged self-withdrawal and a fresh groping towards a new and inspiring national purpose free from the fascinating but obsolete emotions of empire and dominion over other peoples.

Dr. Wingfield-Stratford belongs clearly to the group who wish to withdraw from Europe, in a political sense. He has written before on British civilization and British patriotism. He thinks that England has evolved a civilization of her own free from the inherent tendency towards despotism and militarism characteristic of continental nations. The geography of England as an island has freed her from the necessity (since the Norman Conquest) of maintaining large standing armies with their inevitable accompaniments of centralized administration and militarist psychology, which are fatal to individual liberty.

He points out that the British people developed their legal affairs on the basis of common law as interpreted piecemeal by judges and lawyers in relation to cases, as contrasted with the systematic codes of the Continent based on Roman Law.

The British have always shown a preference for empiricism and action on particular needs in particular situations without much conscious ideology, philosophy, and explicit logic. They have

preferred to muddle through. These traits have imparted their own influence to the individuality of the British and helped them to develop a civilization of their own different from that of continental Europe.

Dr. Wingfield-Stratford holds that the political separation of the U.S.A. from England in the late eighteenth century has not made a separate people and civilization of them from the British. The two together today represent the living ideals of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, of which liberty and justice for themselves and for others are chief ingredients.

The author offers in this book a close and intimate review of British history from the Norman Conquest with a view to distilling the quintessence of British civilization. He does not gloss over defects and blunders and even crimes committed by his people down the centuries in all the continents. But he holds that his people have loved liberty and justice above all virtues and have persistently and indomitably fought their kings and rulers to preserve them. The growth of Parliament, of their liberties in the concrete like the Magna Carta, the struggle with the Tudors and Stuarts, the founding of settlements in America without force, and finally the parting with empire after the last war with but a brief interval of Kiplingism in the last phase (1890-1914) are all depicted with singular and moving honesty. The story ends with the Boer War.

The reader is left with the hope that Britain may yet find a national purpose greater than empire in helping the birth of a new world order based on liberty and justice.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Fire on the Snows of Himalayas. By J. M. GANGULI. (S. Ganguli, Calcutta 26. 126 pp. 1964. Rs. 2.00)

The first half of this tale, as recounted by two Tibetan refugees, tells of the sufferings, both mental and physical, of these hapless people, fleeing in dread before a merciless foe.

The heartache of forsaking ancient homes with cherished memories attached to them, and the agony of those who, separated from their families, knew that each step taken towards freedom and safety was also a step away from loved ones and home, is narrated with poignancy.

Later, the author takes up the story, and indicts with biting reproof the nations of the world whose piously expressed sympathy is all they are willing to give to these gentle, simple people who have lost all.

Our own country does not escape condemnation, and there is a bitter reference to missions of goodwill "to sign joint statements declaring their adherence to five and more principles of peaceful co-existence."

The author feels that the loss of life and the humiliating reverses suffered by India at the hands of the Chinese are a retribution for the complacent indifference of our Government to the subjugation of Tibet. The future, for this little country, seems dark; but, "hope, even lost hope, fights despair and sustains man in his miseries."

It speaks well for the subject-matter and the author's style of writing that, in spite of the innumerable printing errors, the reader's attention is held throughout.

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Isolated items of importance in the newspapers are sometimes read with interest at the time, but slip out of the mind too soon, unless they are given significance by being put together to disclose a trend. The four following items link rewardingly in this way to show a constructive pattern.

Recognition of Guilt. A brave speech (reported by Neil Ascherson in *The Observer,* 14 March 1965) in West Germany's Bundestag by Dr. Adolf Arndt, distinguished between "war crimes" however terrible (the destruction of Dresden by the Allies "in the lust for victory"), and "mass murder" (that of Jewish women and children, etc.) "planned and carried out, ice-cold, by the full machinery of the State." He asserted that the German people, himself included, knew what was being done, and must acknowledge their share of guilt, must do justice to the victims, "confessing ourselves to be what we should be: small humble clearers of a path, the path of righteousness."

Restitution. The Guardian (15 March 1965) reported a project begun by Coventry Cathedral (rebuilt after war destruction), to send a team of people as a gesture to help rebuild the Diakonisen Hospital in Dresden (now East Germany). It was destroyed in the massive raid of February 1945, which killed 202,000 people, and left the town a waste. As the Provost of the Cathedral, the Very Rev. H. C. N. Williams, reminded the congregation, Britain should bow its head in shame, not only for the share in that wanton, senseless destruction, but also because the facts were kept hidden from the British public till five years ago. Only a national gesture of help could heal such a wound.

Change of Mind and Heart. A week later (*The Guardian,* 22 March 1965), Hella Pick described what an American couple are trying to do by individual effort. In horror not only of the destruction of Hiroshima by the United States on 6 August 1945, but also of the terrible legacy of A-bomb sickness that the act left, Dr. Robert Lifton, research psychiatrist at Yale, and his wife Betty, have been stirred by their experiences in the Far East to active endeavours to foster the idea of universal disarmament in America. They work through professional and university groups, lectures, films, and journalism, and Mrs. Lifton is developing the Folded Crane Clubs for children, working for disarmament, that were started by the Japanese at Hiroshima.

Resolve in Practice. When news first reached the West of India's success with the Trombay Plutonium Plant, making her one of the six countries in the world able to produce plutonium at present, the announcement of its exclusive use for peaceful purposes made a great impact. Patrick Keatley (*The Guardian,* 11 March 1965) quoted a statement from a spokesman for the High Commissioner:

> Our decision taken originally by Mr. Nehru and reiterated after the fullest deliberations by Mr. Shastri, is that we will not embark on the production of nuclear weapons. The plutonium from Trombay is for peaceful purposes only — the generation of electric power.

Another threat to the integrity of the human mind — in the guise of "education" and "therapy" — has recently come to the fore. The idea of sleep-learning (impressing information, or imposing behaviour patterns, on the passive sleeping brain by means of small loudspeakers attached to tape re-

corders, placed under the sleeper's pillow) is not new, but has now become acceptable in some scientific circles, though others have had only negative results. At the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Dr. Bliznichchenko claims that one pupil, after 28 nights' sleep-learning, had a standard in spoken English that would normally have needed a year's tuition. Dr. Syvadoshch found that four-fifths of the students tested absorbed on an average 89.5 per cent of information given them during sleep. In Britain, and doubtless elsewhere, sleep-learning has almost become a cult, having regular practitioners, and firms making recorder tapes for "effortless instruction" and "treatment." John Davy, Science Correspondent of *The Observer* (21 March 1965), in an excellent and guarded survey, gives some of the titles — "Study for Examinations with Maximum Results," "Attract Wealth," etc., while others are for overcoming irritability, laziness, fatigue, impotence, backwardness, etc.

Should becoming the passive repository of information be our aim? Many calculating prodigies have, in other respects, been almost morons. In psychological treatment, the relationship between sleep-learning and hypnotism, Couéism, Christian Science, and other systems of "affirmation" becomes even more obvious. Tapes are produced in such a way as to enhance suggestibility, and are combined sometimes with hypnotic suggestion or "preconditioning." Yet doctors mention the ineffectiveness of hypnotism for most psychological problems, and the vulnerability of a percentage of people to special dangers from it.

John Davy gives one important point:

> Electrical brainwave recordings show distinct patterns for deep sleep, but the hypnotic trance pattern is just like waking.

The ancient Hindu knowledge of human states of consciousness (as yet unprovable by Western scientific techniques) can throw light on this, and on the damage caused to the self in man, by this "sorcery" of sleep-learning. Every day and night, each human being circles through three planes of human consciousness, *jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming) and *suṣupti* (deep sleep). *Svapna* is the outcome of personal thought-feeling activity, conscious and subconscious, and is either confused, poisoned, oppressive, or quietened, clarified, organized enough to allow consciousness to pass, as through a channel, to the higher level, that of the higher spiritual mind or self. If, on returning, the consciousness can carry some enlightenment from the higher, through the same channel, the memory is reflected in the physical brain, in the night-visions which instruct, or at least in a sense of refreshment. If *svapna* is agitated, crammed or distorted, nothing beneficial can come though. If, as in sleep-learning, this lower level of sleep is continually vibrating in forced attunement with the intoning tape, how can the consciousness get free to the higher, or bring back anything of the latter's beneficence? This nightly contact, it is said, keeps people sane. Hypnotism, sleep-learning, or anything that imposes a barrier, or even breaks the link, between these two levels of man's nature, must be warned against in the strongest possible terms. John Davy rightly says it "is dipping in very deep waters."